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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 59 JUNE 1961 No. 8 
CONCURRENT CAUSATION IN INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS 
William Conant Brewer, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
MOST property and liability insurance contracts are classified by causation, and contain in their insuring clauses the 
words, "loss caused by . . . " or their equivalent. The phrase is 
deceptively simple. Within it lie a multitude of vexing legal and 
philosophical problems, not the least of which is the problem of 
concurrent causation. 
When an insured cause joins with one or more additional 
causes, which may be uninsured or may be insured under a sepa-
rate contract, concurrent causation can be said to exist. A dispute 
may then arise between the insurance carrier and the insured as 
to whether the damage was caused by an insured event or by an 
event which is either specifically excluded from coverage or simply 
not within the scope of the contract; or in the alternative, a dispute 
may arise between companies as to which of two insurance con-
tracts applies. 
To illustrate the first of these problems, assume that a factory 
which is surrounded by rising flood waters and devoid of normal 
fire protection catches fire and is destroyed. If the fire could have 
been easily extinguished in the absence of flood waters, shall an 
exclusion of flood damage in the insurance policy take precedence 
over the insurance of loss by fire? Or to illustrate the second prob-
lem, assume that a driver, blinded by a sudden fire in his car, col-
lides with a tree and damages the vehicle. Shall the loss be cov-
ered by his fire policy or his collision policy? 
A problem in concurrent causation assumes that at least two 
identifiable causes have been isolated and described for the court. 
At what point in time or circumstances does an event attain the 
• Partner, Peabody, Koufman &: Brewer, Boston, Massachusetts.-Ed. 
The author is indebted to Professor Robert E. Keeton of Harvard Law School for 
reading an earlier draft of this article and making several valuable suggestions thereon, 
although the conclusions reached are of course the responsibility of the author. - W.C.B. 
1142 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
dignity of a cause? This is the problem of remoteness, and it is 
different from that of concurrent causation. If fire causes an ex-
plosion, and the concussion from the explosion damages property 
at a distance, can the fire be said to be a cause of the damage for 
the purposes of the litigation? If so, a selection might then have 
to be made between the fire and the explosion for insurance pur-
poses, and a concurrent causation problem would exist. Both 
problems have been traditionally considered under the heading of 
proximate causation, but they are distinct. Proximate, in its ac-
cepted meaning of close or near, would be better suited to dealing 
with the problem of remoteness. It is to the difficulties presented 
by the need for selecting one of two or more established causes 
that this article is addressed. 
Causation problems must also be distinguished from the nu-
merous problems of definition and status which are encountered 
in insurance litigation. These problems place emphasis upon the 
identity of the insured interest, or the time or place in which the 
insurance shall be effective. They do not customarily deal ·with 
the characterization of those sudden and unexpected events which 
we have come to regard as causes, but rather inquire into the ap-
plication of the contract to normal existing conditions. An electri-
cal cable, for example, is damaged by external forces while discon-
nected from the source of electric energy. Is the loss insured under 
a policy which requires that it be connected and ready for use at 
the time the damage occurs? Or is the passenger on a commercial 
airline insured under a life policy which excludes death while 
engaged in aviation? 
A great deal of work and thought has been devoted to concur-
rent causation problems in the field of torts. Less attention has 
been paid to the insurance cases, and no serious effort has been 
made to formulate the separate rules applicable to them. It is the 
thesis of this article that concurrent causation problems which arise 
under an insurance contract must be handled somewhat differently 
from those which arise in connection with tort litigation, and that 
the tendency to borrow rules of law from the larger tort field and 
apply them to the smaller volume of insurance cases can only retard 
the development of sound doctrine in the field of insurance law. 
II. A VOCABULARY OF CAUSATION 
Philosophers, groping among intangibles, are apt to be as dis-
satisfied with existing vocabulary as with existing philosophers. A 
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common remedy is to create a new vocabulary of their own. So it 
has been with the courts and commentators who have sought to 
impose order on the elusive phenomena of causation. 
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the phrase "proxi-
mate cause" has dominated the vocabulary of legal causation.1 
For the most part it has been used to indicate that single cause to 
which legal consequences are attached, which need not be the most 
"proximate" in time or space.2 From time to time it is said that 
there may be several proximate causes;3 at least one court has said 
that the presence of an exclusion in an insurance policy meant that 
it was unnecessary to have a proximate cause at all.4 
Synonyms and definitions which have been employed by the 
decided cases to clarify the meaning of proximate cause are legion. 
The most widely-quoted definition in the insurance cases is that set 
forth by the court in Lynn Gas & Elec. Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co.rs 
"The active efficient cause that sets in motion a train of 
events which brings about a result without the intervention 
of any force started and working actively from a new and in-
dependent source is the direct and proximate cause referred 
to in the cases." 
The elements of this statement - the active cause and the lack of 
an intervening force - are common to many definitions. 
Where concurrent causes are involved, one finds a similar prac-
tice of introducing new adjectives to supply a definition without 
really clarifying tha method of application. Substantial use is made 
of the word "efficient." An example is the well-known statement 
found in Phillips on Insurance: "In case of the concurrence of 
different causes, to one of which it is necessary to attribute the loss, 
it is to be attributed to the efficient predominating peril, whether 
it is or is not in activity at the consummation of the disaster."6 
1 The Marine Insurance Act of 1906, codifying the existing law of England to that 
time, states at § 55 (1): "[T]he insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril 
insured against, but, subject as aforesaid, he is not liable for any loss which is not proxi-
mately caused by a peril insured against." Marine Ins. Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41. A 
comparable provision appears in the California Insurance Code: "Proximate Cause. An 
insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the proximate cause, al-
though a peril not contemplated by the contract may have been a remote cause of the 
loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a remote 
cause." Gu.. INS. CoDE § 530. 
2 Insurance Company v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117 (1877). 
3Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259 (1933); Sweet v. Perkins, 196 N.Y. 482, 90 N.E. 
50 (1909). 
<l Newark Trust Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 237 Fed. 788 (3d Cir. 1916). 
rs 158 Mass. 570, 575, 33 N.E. 690, 691 (1893). 
6 PHILLIPS, INSURANCE § 1132, p. 678 (5th ed. 1867). 
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As a result of differences in usage, there has been some desire 
to find a new terminology which would be free from the accretions 
of history. The word "actual"7 has been suggested, while Lord 
Dunedin in Leyland Shipping Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. 
Soc'y8 makes his selection by choosing "what I will venture to call 
(though I shrink from the multiplication of epithets) the dominant 
cause of the two." The Restatement uses the phrase "legal cause."9 
Whatever the terminology may be, three types of causes must be 
distinguished in any inteIIigible discussion of causation, and it will 
greatly facilitate such discussion if a separate word can be found 
for each. 
In the first place, there are those causes in fact which are infi-
nite in number and which, as we shall see, radiate in every direc-
tion from any given event. Such a cause may be passive, active, 
expected, unexpected or of any other nature, but in each case it is 
a physical prerequisite to the event in question, which would not 
have occurred "but for" the various causes in fact. This type of 
cause is important only because legal consequences will not flow 
from an event (with a few rare exceptions where two events are 
simultaneous and their consequences indivisible) unless it meets 
the test of being such a cause in fact.1° For such a cause the phrase 
"actual cause" seems appropriate and will be used. 
In the second place, there are often two or more actual causes 
of loss (the proper term in insurance cases) or damage (the proper 
term in tort cases), each of which has passed the test of remoteness, 
from which one cause with legal consequences must be chosen. 
This is the problem of concurrent causation. A generic word must 
be found to indicate the type of cause from which such a choice 
can legitimately be made. While there are various choices, the 
word "substantial" has the advantage of an excellent definition in 
the Restatement of Torts.11 This is the best available phrase and 
will be used. 
7 Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425 (1863). 
s 32 T .L.R. 569 (1916), afj'd, [1917] 1 K.B. 873 (C.A.), afj'd [1918] A.C. 350, 363. 
o REsrATEMENT, TORTS § 431 (1934). See Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 
HARv. L. REv. 103 (1911). 
10 For this purpose Professor Carpenter uses both "actual cause" and "cause in fact." 
The groups of causes from which a single "proximate" or responsible cause can be chosen 
thus become "actual substantial causes" or "substantial causes in fact" in Professor Car-
penters words. Carpenter, Proximate Causation, 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 187, 188-91 (1942). 
Compare Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956). Professors 
Hart and Honore speak of "conditions" or "mere conditions," which constitute the normal 
causal framework of an event, and are distinguished from "causes," which are abnormal. 
HART & HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 30-41 (1959). 
11 REsrATEMENT, TORTS § 431, comment a (1934), states: "The word 'substantial' is 
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Finally, a word or phrase is needed to indicate that single 
substantial cause to which legal consequences attach in the context 
of the particular case. This is of course the sense in which proxi-
mate cause has frequently been used. Because of the confusion 
with questions of remoteness and other unfortunate historical asso-
ciations, however, it seems best to make a clean start, and to use 
some term which is more descriptive of the true intent in concur-
rency cases. It is, furthermore, desirable to avoid the use of a 
phrase which, at least in its general meaning, is descriptive of the 
position of the cause in time or space. What is needed is a term 
which suggests a catalyst or trigger setting off the legal reaction. 
The phrase "responsible cause" is appropriate for this purpose. 
There is, of course, a suggestion of human volition in the word 
"responsible" which arguably should not be applied to events, but 
the idea of an event as responsible for subsequent happenings is 
so firmly imbedded in the language that the usage seems justified. 
A "concurrent cause," then, is a substantial cause which com-
bines with another substantial cause to effect the loss, neither being 
sufficient to do so alone.12 The term is also used occasionally to 
mean independent substantial causes which join to cause an indi-
visible loss but which individually would have been sufficient to 
cause the loss alone.13 Less frequently, one finds the phrase "con-
secutive cause" used to mean one of two or more concurrent causes 
which are causally related to each other. For simplicity's sake, one 
may refer to all problems of selection in which there are two or 
more substantial causes as problems of concurrent causation. 
III. THE PHILOSOPHER'S CAUSATION 
In the analysis of concurrent causation problems which is to 
be found in the decided cases, one is at once made aware of the 
used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the 
harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular 
sense in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called 
'philosophic sense,' which includes every one of the great number of events without which 
any happening would not have occurred." In the context of insurance cases, the idea of 
responsibility is absent, and selection of possible substantial causes becomes a question of 
remoteness. An example of the difference between actual cause and substantial cause 
occurs in those cases in which recovery is denied under a fire insurance policy when a 
"friendly" fire such as a match flame ignites explosive vapors. The flame is, of course, an 
actual cause, but not a substantial cause. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 183 U.S. 
42 (1901). 
12 See generally Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1127 
(1934). The Restatement requires that, to be concurrent, the forces "be in active and 
substantially simultaneous operation." REsrATEMENT, TORTS § 441 (d) (1934). 
lS E.g., Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 15 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. 427, 446 (1942). 
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formidable conceptual difficulties inherent in the nature of causa-
tion itself. It is helpful to review the basic dilemma which it pre-
sents to the philosopher, so that we may know the inevitable limits 
of any doctrine of law which relies on identification and descrip-
tion of specific causative factors. 
Mankind itself has, for the most part, got along well ·with cau-
sation. While it is a complicated concept, and one inadequately 
expressed by language, it is nonetheless a companion of our daily 
life and so understood by juries, businessmen, and private persons. 
It is this body of common understanding, rather than development 
of theory, which has permitted causation to be a useful instrument 
for the draftsmen. 
Commonly it is said that one event leads to another. It is ap-
parent that the idea of a series of events, each one the cause of the 
next, has an element of truth; but a closer analysis brings to light 
the fact that causal relationships are woven into a much more com-
plicated fabric than such an analogy would suggest. 
"Causes are spoken of as if they were as distinct from one 
another as beads in a row or links in a chain, but - if this 
metaphysical topic has to be referred to - it is not wholly so. 
The chain of causation is a handy expression, but the figure is 
inadequate. Causation is not a chain, but a net. At each point 
influences, forces, events, precedent and simultaneous, meet; 
and the radiation from each point extends infinitely."14 
Just as a net is more suggestive of the truth than a chain, the 
net must, upon further thought, give way to some further analogy 
with multiple dimensions. Every identifiable event might be 
imagined to be at the center of a sphere. From this center radiate 
an infinite number of causative factors, each expanding outward 
to an infinite distance, and each in turn endowed with its o-wn in-
finite periphery of consequences. "Hence we have to regard each 
cause we see in operation as resulting from an integration of 
causes, or rather of forces, conditions, antecedents, becoming more 
complex with each step of retrogression, carrying us back to an 
infinite complexity."15 A member of the Canadian bar, in an in-
structive and amusing essay on the subject, has termed this the 
problem of "infinite regress."16 
14 Leyland Shipping Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, 32 T.L.R. 569 (1916). 
afj'd, [1917] 1 K.B. 873 (C.A.), afj'd, [1918] A.C. 350, 369 (concurring opinion of Lord 
Shaw of Dunfermline). 
15 SPENCER, FAcrs AND COMMENTS 215 (1902). 
16 Patterson, Cause in Law b Metaphysics, 10 CAN. B. R.Ev. 645 (1932). 
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By virtue of its nature, any element or event in a sequence of 
causation can be repeatedly subdivided into other elements in time 
and space. Fortunately for the conduct of affairs, however, the 
human mind has become skilled in grouping certain elements of 
experience into rough units which can be dealt with by the ordi-
nary resources of language, and in our particular case, by the 
language of the insurance draftsman. These consist for the most 
part of events which have traditionally impressed themselves on 
the memory and experience of mankind, either because of force 
and violence associated with them, or the catastrophes which fol-
lowed, or because of their unusual and striking nature. 
Fires caused by spontaneous combustion will illustrate this 
point. It is relatively infrequent in man's experience that oily rags 
will be in proximity to each other, and ·within such a confined 
space, that the temperature of combustion will be attained. As a 
result this factor in the causation network is roughly distinguish-
able and can be used as a labeling device. So also can the fire which 
follows, if a less specific label is desired. However, to choose one 
among many, the presence of oxygen in atmospheric proportions 
at the time when combustion occurred is also, in a true sense of 
the word, a cause of the resulting financial loss. The presence of 
oxygen, however, unlike the presence of spontaneous combustion, 
is a common condition in the affairs of mankind and so useless for 
our purposes, even though a true part of the causation network 
and an actual cause of the fire. 
This everyday usage of causation was ignored by the many phi-
losophers who wrote on the subject prior to the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Early philosophical inquiries into causation 
were extensively concerned ,;vith the forces which lay behind and 
animated physical phenomena. The turning point came with John 
Stuart Mill, who formulated what is essentially the modern view 
in A System of Logic, the first edition of which appeared in 1843. 
Mill's thinking and writing have a rational flavor which appeal to 
the lawyer; many of his remarks on causation can be read with 
profit today. To the insurance lawyer, they have the additional 
merit of avoiding the deep involvement ,;vith torts which charac-
terizes most recent discussions of the subject. 
To Mill, causation is "but the familiar truth, that invariability 
of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact 
in nature and some other fact which has preceded it."17 This in 
17 MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, Vol. 1, Bk. m, c. V, p. 364 (5th ed. 1862). 
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itself represented nothing original: Mill's break with tradition 
came in his refusal to consider the "supposed necessity of ascend-
ing higher, into the essences and inherent constitution of things"18 
to find the metaphysical force behind causation. His conclusions 
anticipated later scholars who, although writing in the idiom of 
science, find uses for causation which are entirely consistent ·with 
doubt concerning its true nature. 
Mill is also quite aware of the multifold character of causation. 
He decries the arbitrary selection of a single cause from the in-
finity of conditions: "However numerous the conditions may be, 
there is hardly any of them which may not, according to the pur-
pose of our immediate discourse, obtain that nominal pre-emi-
nence."19 For any scientific purpose, he states, the true cause must 
be expressed as the total of all the conditions necessary for the 
effect. But then he goes on to say that one may properly, for use 
in common parlance, select a single cause, which is usually that 
one "whose share in the matter is superficially the most conspicu-
ous, or whose requisiteness to the production of the effect we hap-
pen to be insisting upon at the moment."20 It is upon this plain 
man's concept that the usage of causation in the insurance contract 
is founded. 
Later thought about the subject has qualified Mill's idea of 
invariable and unconditional sequence, and has suggested that 
causal relationships between human beings, so important in tort 
law, are inadequately explained by his theory.21 But his awareness 
of the futility of investigating the "essences" remains a corner-
stone of causal thinking today. 
Though capable of being turned to practical use, the true na-
ture of causation remains uncertain. Any extended analysis of 
causation leads eventually to an awareness of the limitations of 
the human mind in comprehending the universe around us. As 
Mill foresaw, philosophical attempts to define the nature of causa-
tion, or causality as it is more commonly spoken of by philosophers, 
have been uniformly unsuccessful, and by now have been either 
abandoned as fruitless or by-passed upon the assumption that time 
and space have no real existence. 
Causality, if it exists at all, is now thought of as a sequence or 
relationship of events following one another in time. Upon mak-
18Ibid. 
19 Id. at 367. 
20 Id. at 368. 
21 IIART &: HONORE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 20-23. 
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ing the attempt to prove that such a sequence does in fact exist, 
great difficulties arise. In the first place, it is impossible to define 
"event" in terms which are completely satisfactory, or to reproduce 
it experimentally with absolute precision. Refinements can of 
course be made, and under laboratory conditions may succeed in 
reducing extraneous factors to a minimum, but in the last analysis 
no two events can be created which are exactly alike, and therefore 
no causal sequence can be exactly duplicated. 
Even if the problems of definition of events and reproduction 
are overcome, a second and equally insurmountable obstacle is 
met. No physical relationship can be observed or measured with-
out producing, as a consequence, some indefinite change in the 
relationship itself as a result of the application of the measuring 
instrument. In the macroscopic sphere this is negligible and may 
be safely ignored; in microscopic investigation it can ordinarily 
be taken into account; but in the investigation of molecular, 
atomic, and sub-atomic particles, where any investigation of funda-
mental laws must today be accomplished, the problem is more 
serious. It is apparent here that the instruments used to measure 
the frequency, course, and velocity of such particles depend for 
their function upon the interaction of the quantum to be meas-
ured with energy in one form or another produced by the measur-
ing instrument, which itself produces a significant and unmeasur-
able deflection of the result.22 Any attempt to measure the extent 
of this deflection encounters a similar and more difficult problem. 
In the area where a hypothetical law of causality must be proved 
or disproved, then, no final proof is possible. 
22 The following colloquy on this subject is to be found in a recent interview with 
Louis de Broglie, French physicist and Nobel Prize winner: 
- Continuerons-nous a voir de plus en plus petit indefiniment? 
- Je ne le crois pas. A mon avis, I'homme ne pourra jamais aller beaucoup plus 
loin dans l'exploration visuelle de l'infiniment petit. Car, au-dela du seuil desormais 
atteint, on ne peut plus distinguer Ies dimensions exterieures, on arrive aux dimensions 
internes de l'atome. 
- Et de ce fait? 
- Photographier au microscope cHectronique correspond a bombarder Ia cible avec des 
electrons. Ces electrons ont Ieur mecanique propre. J'ai etabli que cette mecanique etait 
ondulatoire, exactement comme celle de la Iumiere. Pour etre en mesure de discerner les 
details de la structure interne de l'atome, iI faudrait arriver a reduire considerablement la 
longueur d'onde des corpuscules frappeurs. Dans ce cas, des Jes premiers chocs, ceux-
d boulcverscront de fond en comble Ia structure interne de l'atome, en Iui enlevant des 
electrons. Charges de photographier, ils ne pourront pas accomplir Ieur mission en raison 
de l'aneantisscment de son objet meme. 
- Cela signifie qu'au niveau de l'atome on ne peut plus voir sans, en meme temps, 
dc!truire? 
-D'apres moi, certainement. Le sujet transforme l'objet au moment meme ou il a 
prise sur Iui. 
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As a result, scientists who concern themselves with such matters 
have developed the concept of a relationship between hypothetical 
events of an ideal nature which can be defined with precision only 
by the use of differential equations. In effect, the scientist states 
that is is immaterial to his work whether or not a basically predict-
able relationship exists between the real events with which he is 
dealing, since the vast majority of real events can be successfully 
dealt with as analogous to ideal events whose conduct and relation-
ship can be strictly defined. Max Planck, the distinguished scien-
tist and philosopher who developed quantum theory, termed this 
hypothetical view a "world-picture," and conceived all causation 
problems as consisting of a series of imaginary events with defined 
characteristics.23 Laws based on the relationship of such events 
were useful, even if not absolute in nature. 
It is of course clear that causality, despite its conceptual failings, 
remains indispensable to mankind. Bertrand Russell distinguished 
the application of causality as an everyday working tool from true 
causality and called it "the law of probable sequence," admitting 
it to be helpful in ordinary affairs and "in the infancy of a sci-
ence."24 Planck felt that any working scientist would profit from 
a belief in causality, it being a signpost amid the confusion of 
events to show us the direction we must advance to attain fruitful 
results;25 the absolute law must, however, be applicable only in the 
case of the ideal mind, which, knowing all, could predict all. 
A draftsman who has a touch of metaphysics is a better drafts-
man, for he approaches his task with humility; his "world-picture" 
may not coincide with reality. By a wise selection of causative 
elements, he must describe the vision of an insured event. Greater 
precision can be gained by a multiplication and refinement of the 
elements chosen, as in the laboratory, but greater precision is often 
the enemy of clarity, and certainly of brevity. Wisdom comes to 
the draftsman when he realizes that his selection must fall some-
where along the infinite progression toward absolute predictability. 
Interview with Louis de Broglie, Realites, March 1961, p. 91, 94. The same point 
was made on the philosophical level by the biologist Alexis Carrel: "Les savants font 
souvent l'etrange erreur d'observer les phenomenes naturels comme si eux-mc!mes se 
trouvaient hors de la nature. En realite, i1s sont partie d'un systeme material compose 
de l'observateur et de l'objet de son observation." CARREL, REFLEXIONS SUR LA CoNDUITE 
DE LA Vm 35 (1951). 
23 PLANCK, SCIENCE TODAY 345, 351 (Thomson ed. 1934). 
24 RussELL, MYSTICISM & LOGIC 188 (1918). 
25 PLANCK, op. cit. supra note 23, at 352, 365. 
1961] CAUSATION IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 1151 
IV. PROXIMATE CAUSATION IN TORTS 
Injure non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur. (In law, the 
proximate and not the remote cause is to be looked to.)26 So reads 
the first and most famous of Bacon's maxims. In comment Lord 
Bacon states: "It were infinite for the law to judge the causes of 
causes, and their impulsions one of another: therefore it contenteth 
itself with the immediate cause; and judgeth of acts by that, 
without looking to any further degree."27 
It has been suggested28 that Bacon was not so much interested 
in defining a metaphysical concept as in showing his annoyance 
with the scholastic tendency to seek obscure and elaborate reasons 
for simple acts. The maxim does not appear to have been widely 
quoted in legal commentaries until the middle of the nineteenth 
century. The first usage of the word "proximate" in the cases was 
found by Professor Beale29 in 1830. Shortly thereafter the maxim 
was included in and may have been given currency by the first 
(1845) of the numerous editions of Broom's Maxims. Broom states 
that the maxim was "almost exclusively applied" in marine insur-
ance cases,30 and an examination of the cases suggests that this was 
true throughout the nineteenth century. 
During our own century, however, the problem of proximate 
causation has not suffered from lack of attention. Starting with 
Professor Smith in 1911,31 the problem has attracted numerous 
scholars,32 no doubt because of the challenging metaphysical and 
conceptual difficulties it presents. Professor Beale, whose article33 
is a landmark in the field, reviewed the history and developed cer-
tain rules for determining proximate causation in tort cases. These 
rules were in turn perfected and added to by Professor McLaugh-
lin.34 Professor Edgerton311 and Dean Green36 argued with con-
26 Bacon, Maxims, Regula I, in 7 SPEDDING, ELLIS &: HEATH, THE WoRKS OF FRANCIS 
BACON 327 (1870). 
21 Ibid. 
28 Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 AM. L. REv. 201 (1870). 
29 Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv. 633, 635 (1920), 
citing Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211, 212 (1830). 
30 BROOM, MAxlMs 167 (3d Am. ed. 1852). 
81 Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (pts. 1-3), 25 HARv. L. REv. 103, 223, 303 
(1911-1912). 
82 Professor Carpenter lists 37 signed law review articles, without counting numerous 
unsigned notes and comments. Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 14 So. CAL. L. REv. I (1940). 
Since his article appeared the Index to Legal Periodicals shows 99 entries under the 
heading "Proximate Cause," the great majority being concerned with the law of torts. 
83 Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv. 633 (1920). 
8¼ McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARv. L. REv. 149 (1925). 
35Edgerton, Legal Cause (pts. 1-2), 72 U. PA. L. REv. 211, 343 (1924). 
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siderable force that proximate cause should be abandoned alto-
gether, and other tests substituted. Professor Carpenter,87 in an 
encyclopedic series of articles, states that sound rules of proximate 
causation can be applied by any intelligent court, and after distin-
guishing cases based on unsound rules or perhaps lack of intelli-
gence, proceeds to set forth a body of rules of his own. Professors 
Hart and Honore have recently made an exhaustive and thought-
ful study of the subject from the English point of view in their 
book Causation in the Law.38 There are many others who have 
written on the subject; those mentioned are illustrative only. 
In addition to commentary, thousands of decided cases have 
quoted and used the concept of proximate cause, in most cases 
adding some dictum or definition to the body of learning on the 
subject. It is apparent that a causation problem inspires general-
ization, usually of a rhetorical or philosophical nature, in the most 
conservative of courts. By and large, the analysis has been shallow, 
the general rule that a single proximate cause may be found in all 
cases by the application of the proper test or definition being wide-
ly quoted, with little evidence that the scholarly investigations of 
the subject have been considered. Most references to the rule 
today are to be found in cases involving negligence, simply because 
there are now many more negligence cases relative to other types 
of litigation. 
A sampling of this considerable literature and of the reported 
cases is of great assistance in overcoming the conceptual difficulties 
which surround causation problems, providing as it does hundreds 
of disputed fact situations, and many helpful insights of a general 
nature. So far as the development of specific rules of law for in-
surance cases is concerned, however, it is of less value, since most 
of the work that has been done is concerned with tort law alone. 
Those comments which are concerned with questions of remote-
ness, and some of those with respect to multiple causes, do provide 
analogies which are helpful. 
Under the general rubric of causation, there are three separate 
kinds of inquiry which are found in a tort case, and a distinction 
must be made for the purpose of analysis even if it is not always 
made in practice. These might be put as follows: 
36 Green, A.re There Dependable Rules of Causation1 77 U. PA. L. REv. 601 (1929). 
See generally McCORMICK, DAMAGES 260-69 (1935). 
87 Carpenter, Proximate Cause (pts. 1-8), 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 1, 115, 416; 15 So. CAL. L. 
REv. 187,304,427; 16 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. l, 61, 275 (1940-1943). 
ss HART &: HoNORE, op. cit. supra note 10. 
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(I) What were the actual events leading up to the damages 
suffered by plaintiff? This inquiry is explanatory in nature. It is 
analogous to the question asked by a scientist who seeks to explain 
an observed phenomenon, and for its answer, a similar investiga-
tion of fact must be made and interpreted as a logical sequence of 
physical occurrences. This is preeminently the function of the 
jury. A determination of what has in fact taken place is quite 
clearly distinguishable from a characterization of such findings in 
terms of legal responsibility. 
(2) Was defendant negligent? It is generally accepted that the 
question of whether a defendant was negligent is distinct from the 
question of liability for negligence. To the first of these inquiries 
we apply tests which in the main revolve about foreseeability, 
which is to say the foresight of a reasonable man in the circum-
stances of the defendant rather than the defendant himself. Prin-
ciples of causation are customarily applied to the task of determin-
ing whether harm can reasonably be anticipated from given 
conduct. It should be noted that the particular harm which leads 
the conduct of defendant to be characterized as negligent may or 
may not be the actual harm suffered by plaintiff or, if it is the same, 
it may be caused by unforeseen means. 
This question is of course unique to tort law. Insurance litiga-
tion requires no equivalent step. The problem of defining negli-
gence does entail an analysis of risk and thus of remoteness, with 
occasional attention to the problem of intervenors, but on the 
whole it does not furnish analogies which are helpful in the solu-
tion of concurrent causation problems. 
(3) Is defendant liable for the injuries suffered by the plain-
tiff? This is the final and most difficult problem, and although 
more complicated in the field of torts, it is similar in principle to 
the difficulties found in insurance. At the outset there are in each 
case two kno"<vn events: in tort, the negligent act and the damages, 
and in insurance, the insured event and the loss. The question is 
very simply whether, for the purposes of the case, the one can be 
said to be the responsible cause of the other. It is not of particular 
importance that in some cases the problem is spoken of prospec-
tively, as one might do in attempting to predict a result from 
known circumstances, and in other cases retrospectively, in the 
manner of an explanatory inquiry. Beneath each question lies the 
same issue. 
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In their broadest outline, the steps which must be taken to 
resolve, this issue are common to tort and insurance. Is the event 
in question an actual cause? If so, does it constitute a substantial 
cause, or is it too remote? If there is more than one substantial 
cause, to which shall legal consequences be attached? 
It is generally agreed, in tort cases as in insurance cases, that 
the threshold question in causation matters should be whether 
the disputed event was an actual cause of the damage.39 The best 
way to identify an actual cause is to ask whether the damage would 
not have happened "but for" the event. If the answer is affirma-
tive, then the event, be it ever so insignificant or remote, is an 
actual cause of the loss. 
But, as we have seen, there is an infinite number of actual 
causes of every result. The problem is to reduce this multitude of 
actual causes to a single cause or a few causes which are outside the 
ordinary expectation of mankind and which are not too remote 
from the damage; which are, in other words, substantial causes. 
It cannot be disputed that, in the selection of substantial causes 
from actual causes, the general pragmatic and historical experience 
of mankind plays a larger part than philosophical or legal elabora-
tions of the subject, at least in the common law jurisdictions. To 
the ordinary man ( ordinary only in the sense that he is not steeped 
in the refinements of causation), a cause is always a substantial 
cause, and it is customarily an event which stands out as unusual 
or unexpected in the circumstances in which it exists, or in the 
light of the question asked. Though he would rarely reach the 
question, he would, if pressed, provide rough generalizations of 
causal sequence to justify his choice, generalizations lacking the 
specific detail necessary for scientific predictions, but quite ade-
quate for use in the ordinary affairs of mankind. These folk gen-
eralizations form the indispensable basis of common-law causation. 
39 REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 432 (1) (1934). For a dissenting view, see Malone, Rumina-
tions on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. R.Ev. 60 (1956). Professor Malone points out that the 
captain who failed to tum back his ship might not have saved the drowning seaman, or 
that the lady who slipped on the unlighted stairs might have slipped with the best of 
illumination, so that the negligent conduct was not necessarily an actual cause. But is not 
the problem really one of proof? The determination of the responsible cause, whether 
the case be in tort or contract, involves a determination of the twin facts that it was an 
actual cause, and also a substantial factor in the result. It is perfectly true that 
standards of proof may vary in tort cases, with less proof of the relationship being required 
where the conduct is more reprehensible [Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d I 
(1948); Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 130 Atl. 145 (1925)], but 
this should not lead to the abandonment of the "but for" test, giving as it does a sound 
result in almost every case, and being one of the few rules in this area capable of comprc-
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Admittedly the process by which a court actually decides the 
question of whether a given negligent act is or is not a responsible 
cause of the damages suffered by plaintiff may be far removed 
from the simple generalizations of daily life. Even at what might 
be called the pre-legal stage of causal thinking, however, consid-
erations of policy are present and begin to take on a character 
which is distinctive to each field of the law, and which can be inter-
changed only to their detriment. At this point the law of tort and 
insurance may be said to part company. · 
It is widely thought, for example, that moral and punitive ele-
ments affect everyday judgments of responsibility for negligent 
acts, regardless of legal doctrine. Common wisdom may of itself 
suggest that the use of a pistol will become the responsible cause 
of consequences which would be remote if the negligent act had 
been the use of an automobile. These judgments may find their 
way directly or by analogy into legal doctrine.40 
Of a similiar nature, but more complex, are the considerations 
of policy which have an ascertainable legal source, either drawn 
from the decided cases, or as a response to those needs of society 
which are expressed in statutory or administrative law. Here pub-
lic policy, as it appears in the determination of whether a given 
cause is or is not remote, is derivative in nature, tending to reflect 
original value judgments made in other areas of society. Thus, 
violation of a statute requiring the licensing of drivers might create 
a causal relationship between the act of driving and the ultimate 
injury which would not exist if the requirement of licensing were 
not in large part directed toward the avoidance of highway 
accidents. 
There are factors other than public policy which tend to set 
apart the tests of remoteness in the tort field from those in insur-
ance. The form of the proceeding itself has an effect. In tort the 
action is most frequently against a party for damages resulting 
from his own act, in contrast with the insurance cases where the 
suit is against a third party who has no connection with the opera-
tive facts. Even more important, the tort action is based on the 
voluntary act or omission of an individual. "The starting-point 
of any investigation of legal liability is some act or non-action of a 
hension by a jury. See generally McCORMICK, DAMAGES 261 (1935); PROSSER, TORTS 221 
(2d ed. 1955). 
40 Their arrival docs not meet with universal approval. For citations and critical 
comment, sec generally HART&: HoNoRt, op. cit. supra note 10, at 272-73. 
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human being."41 In property insurance matters the opposite is 
generally true. While a fire, for example, may be caused by human 
error, it is the fire rather than the error which is the responsible 
cause under the contract. Both of these factors in tort cases tend to 
focus attention on the act of the defendant, with its moral and 
punitive overtones, and, by thus diminishing other causes in rela-
tive importance, to encourage analysis of the causation problem 
in terms of proximity rather than concurrency. 
One of the most troublesome causation problems in the tort 
field is that of intervention. It takes many forms; it may appear 
in connection with the definition of legal duty, or as the problem 
of whether the defendant's negligent act has become too remote 
from the damage because of the intervening voluntary action of 
another. Typically, defendant in some manner motivates or pro-
vides the opportunity for the later action. In defining duty, the 
discussion may be in terms of probability of intervention. In dam-
age problems the analysis is usually in terms of remoteness, or of 
"cutting off" the chain of causation, rather than in terms of con-
currency.42 This is logical if moral values are regarded as influ-
ential in determining the remoteness of a voluntary act. 
An example of the effect of intervention on the standard of 
duty can be simply stated. A storekeeper leaves an ice pick on the 
counter where it can be reached by children in his store. A child 
in fact plays with the ice pick and injures the plaintiff. For in-
surance purposes such a situation might be examined in terms of 
concurrent causes, but for the purpose of defining negligence, the 
question is whether he fell short of his duty by not anticipating that 
a child might use the pick as a toy and injure another. 
Out of the problem of intervention comes the major difference 
of opinion with respect to the extent of responsibility for damages 
in tort. This is the question of whether a negligent defendant shall 
be chargeable for all of the damages of which his conduct is an 
actual cause and which is of the type whose likelihood of occur-
rence caused his action to be classified as negligent; or whether 
his responsibility shall be limited to damages substantially caused 
by his conduct. Alexander v. Town of New Castle43 will illustrate 
the difference. Here defendant left an open pit in a highway, an 
action properly regarded as negligent because of the hazard that 
41 Beale, supra note 33, at 637. 
42 See generally HART &: HONORE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 38-41. 
43115 Ind. 51, 17 N.E. 200 (1888). 
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travelers would inadvertently fall in. Plaintiff, a sheriff, became 
involved in an altercation with one of his prisoners, and was thrown 
in. Under the "risk" theory, plaintiff might recover, his injuries 
being of the expected type even though the mechanism, or causal 
connection, could not be foreseen. Under the traditional causa-
tion theory, the voluntary act of the third person intervened and 
caused the damage to be too remote to permit recovery. 
A relatively few tort cases present the question of true con-
currency without subsequent intervention. Here the discussion, 
while not directly applicable to the insurance cases, is of value. 
These cases fall into two distinct categories. While hunting, A 
and B fire at a moving object without taking due care to ascertain 
its identity. They find C., another hunter, wounded upon the 
ground. A bullet has passed through his neck. There is no way 
of knowing who fired the wrongful shot, although it is clear that 
either A or B could have done so.44 A variant on this theme 
is the case where each contributes to an indivisible injury. Thus 
A and B negligently ride their motorcycles past C., causing C's 
horse to run away and C to be injured.45 
In these cases the courts have had no trouble finding that the 
conduct of either A or B alone is sufficient cause of the injury to 
impose liability, even though, in the first case, it is impossible to 
tell which action was the actual cause; and even though, in the 
second case, the precise contribution of each act cannot be estab-
lished. The basis of decision in these cases should not be regarded 
as an abandonment of actual cause, but rather, as Professor Car-
penter suggests,46 a relaxation of the rules of proof in a situation 
where, in the absence of such relaxation, the courts would be in-
capable of dealing with a situation which clearly calls for relief. 
As will be seen, there is a parallel situation in certain insurance 
cases where a separate insurance contract attaches to each of two 
44Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d I (1948); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 
110 So. 666 (1926). For similar criminal cases, cf. State v. Newberg, 129 Ore. 564, 278 Pac. 
568 (1929); Queen v. Salmon, 6 Q.B.D. 79 (1880). 
45 Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902). In criminal cases, the action 
of each must materially contribute to the injury. Wilson v. State, 24 S.W. 409 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1893). 
46 Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 14 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. 115, 134 (1941). This explanation 
is consistent with the variations in proof of actual cause which are required in other tort 
cases; thus, the burden of showing causal connection between the alleged act and the 
injury is greater in a malpractice case than in a gun-handling case, presumably because 
of the community interests at stake in each. Note also that considerable variation exists 
in the standards applied to remoteness of actual causes; in civil cases the cause must be 
"closer" to the loss or damage than in criminal cases or tort cases having a criminal flavor. 
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substantial causes of loss; but the outcome is usually a division of 
responsibility because of the contribution clauses of the two con-
tracts. Something similar to this could have developed in tort 
law, as it has in admiralty. That it has not is probably a reflection 
of the punitive element which is present to a greater or lesser extent 
in all tort cases. 
There are other cases where the negligent persons are separate 
in time or space and are unaware of each other,47 or where the 
act of the negligent person is joined by an innocent act or a natural 
±orce to cause an indivisible injury.48 Without undertaking ex-
tended analysis, it is sufficient to say that most courts today find 
each negligent party to be liable for the entire injury, even though 
his act alone would not have caused the injury. Here again pun-
ishment seems to play a part. 
Despite common-sense analogies and common-law precedents, 
the task of segregating substantial causes from the infinity of actual 
causes, and of choosing a responsible cause if there is more than 
one substantial cause, remains a difficult one in tort law as else-
where. In one sense, the choice is subject to rules of causation 
which must be expressed. In another sense, these rules are them-
selves so deeply affected by the needs of society and by special 
doctrines of law applicable to the particular case that one is tempt-
ed, like Dean Green,49 to abandon causation altogether in dealing 
with questions of remoteness. It seems better, however, to recog-
nize that causal notions are too deeply rooted in our thinking to 
be given up, even though their character varies substantially with 
the situation in which they are applied. 
V. UsE OF CAUSATION IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
Causation is the principal device used by the insurance drafts-
man to bring the risk assumed by the insurer within proportions 
which can be measured by the use of statistics and given a value in 
dollars. 
47 Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S.W .2d 544 (1929); 
Orton v. Virginia Carolina Chemical Co., 142 La. 790, 77 So. 632 (1918); Northup v. 
Eakes, 72 Okla. 66, 178 Pac. 266 (1918). 
48 Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Sainte Marie Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 
N.W. 45 (1920). Contra, Cook v. Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Sainte Marie Ry., 98 
Wis. 624, 74 N.W. 561 (1898). The principal difference of opinion in this area concerns 
the cases in which a tortious act joins with an innocent act to cause the harm. Majority 
opinion today favors liability in this situation. REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 439 (1934). See, 
contra, Peaslee, supra note 12. 
49 Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation? 77 U. PA. L. REv. 601 (1929). 
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Risk, of course, is a slippery thing by nature. Despite constant 
efforts, it continues to slither out of policy language which is in-
tended to contain it ·within profitable limits. From time to time 
the equilibrium of the insurance business is upset by a court which 
discovers that a loss of a novel type, or of a type which the insurer 
has hitherto regarded as uninsured, falls within the policy lan-
guage. If the loss is of a type which is likely to re-occur, and the 
court of sufficient dignity to suggest that its remarks might be taken 
seriously by other tribunals, the draftsman must set to work to plug 
the gap.50 
Though naturally of importance to the company, the predict-
ability of consequences under insurance policies has general im-
plications as well: the solvency of the company and the protection 
of other policyholders may be threatened by the exposure of the 
company to risks for which no premium has been received. Leg-
islative policy has concerned itself in recent years with the same 
problem, it being a requirement in all states that an adequate 
premium be charged for fire and casualty risks assumed.51 
The role which causation plays in this battle to keep insurance 
risks within measurable bounds is an ancient one. In the marine 
insurance form, first used by Lloyd's in 1779 and virtually un-
changed today, coverage is provided for loss caused by perils of the 
sea.52 When fire insurance first became available, as a result of the 
110 E.g., Scripture v. Lowell Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cush. 356 (Mass. 1852) (explosion 
of gunpowder a "fire," resulting in exclusion of explosion); Bower v. Aetna Ins. Co., 54 
F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1944) (freezing an explosion under extended coverage, resulting 
in exclusion of freezing); Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of Georgia, 197 F.2d 
455 (5th Cir. 1952) (water hammer an explosion under extended coverage, resulting in 
exclusion of water hammer). Or the draftsman may foresee the possibility of adverse 
litigation and act accordingly. Thus, the exclusion from the fire policy of loss caused by 
nuclear energy in its various manifestations was motivated by the fear that an atomic 
reaction might be considered a fire. See generally Kelly, Fire Insurance Problems in the 
Atomic Age, 1955 Proceedings, Section of Insurance Law, American Bar Association, p. 209. 
111 In New York, for example, the Superintendent may order rate filings to be with-
drawn if he finds them "inadequate, excessive, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise un-
reasonable." N.Y. INs. LAw § 184 (6). This phrase is taken from the uniform rating laws 
drafted by the All-Industry Committee appointed by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners in 1944, and recommended by the Association to the various states. Model 
Rate Regulatory Bill § 4 (A)3, contained in Report of Committee on Rates and Rating 
Organizations, NAT'L Ass'N INS. COMM'RS PROC. 77th Ann. Sess., 391-421 (1946). These laws 
have been adopted with minor changes by all of the states. They were a direct response 
to the decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), 
holding insurance to be interstate commerce; and to the ensuing legislation, which granted 
to the states the continued responsibility for regulation of insurance, and provided that 
the federal antitrust laws would not apply "to the extent that" the states occupied the 
field. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958). 
112 "Touching the adventures and perils which the said Company is content to bear 
and take upon itself, they are of the Seas, Fires, Collisions, Pirates, Thieves, Barratry of 
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London conflagration of 1666, the policy insured loss by fire, as it 
does today.53 In each case the causal limitation circumscribed the 
risk, and formed the basis on which the premium could be com-
puted and statistics assembled. 
In addition to playing a part in the description of the risk, 
causal descriptions are invariably found in the various exclusions 
or exceptions to coverage contained in every policy. These, it has 
been succinctly stated, "make clear what is insured against by 
reciting what is not insured against."54 It is the interplay between 
the insuring agreement, containing the description of the risk 
assumed, and the exclusions or exceptions, which defines the in-
surance coverage. 
Not every risk can be insured, of course. To be insurable, it 
must meet two requirements which arise out of the basically 
financial nature of the transaction: 
1. The risk itself must be capable of reduction to or measure-
ment by a dollar premium. Here exclusions are of paramount 
importance, being used to eliminate those portions of the risk 
which cannot be satisfactorily rated in money terms because of 
infrequency, unusual frequency, excessive exposure to a single loss, 
or other reasons. 
2. The loss which may result from the risk must also be capa-
ble of translation into dollars with reasonable accuracy. This re-
quires the draftsman to exclude damages from loss of contract, 
delay in deliveries, competitive disadvantage, obsolescence of ma-
chinery, and many other indefinite or incalculable injuries which 
are often substantial in amount. The obligation of the insurer is 
always to pay a sum of money (the insured loss) though the insur-
ance be conditioned upon the burning of a house or the sinking of 
a ship. "These are the subject-matter of insurance, but the subject-
matter of the contract is money, and money only."55 
These necessities are well known to the insurance undenvriter 
or draftsman. His task is to design policy language which meets 
these requirements by designation of the appropriate insured event 
the Master and Mariners, and all other like perils, losses and misfortunes that have or 
shall come to the hurt, detriment or damage of the said vessel or any part thereof." 
58 The New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, which has been adopted as a 
standard form by legislative or administrative action in many states, speaks of insurance 
"against all direct loss by fire .... " It is not felt that the omission of the word "caused" 
changes the meaning or intent. N.Y. INs. LAw § 168 (6). 
54Newark Trust Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 237 Fed. 788 (3d Cir. 1916). 
55 Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1, 9 (1881). 
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and exclusions therefrom. In the language of causation, he must 
choose the responsible cause of :financial loss which he is willing 
to insure in all circumstances except upon occurrence of certain 
other substantial causes. 
So described, the process of agreement and exclusion has a 
misleading atmosphere of precision about it. Any :financial loss of 
a type which can be insured has a number of substantial causes. 
In the case of a boiler explosion, for example, the sequence of 
events may start with the carelessness of the operating fireman, 
which leads to low water in the boiler, which leads to excessive 
steam pressure, which in tum leads to a sudden and accidental 
tearing asunder of the boiler, and which in tum leads to the true 
object of the insurance: the :financial loss. Loss caused by any of 
these factors would be insurable. Any one could be chosen as the 
responsible cause, and yet a choice of one, such as tearing asunder, 
may result in a coverage significantly different from the choice 
of another, such as the negligence of firemen. 
There is no uniformity among the various forms of insurance 
with respect to the position in time of the responsible cause. His-
tory in this area is more important than logic. The "distance" of 
the insured cause from the :financial loss may vary from the perils 
of the sea (so distant that a number of intervening events are 
necessary) through fire ( closer, but fire must cause property dam-
age before the loss occurs) to tearing asunder (this is the damage 
itself). It might be said that the farther the responsible cause from 
the :financial loss, the broader the coverage, but even this general-
ization may not be true where there are unexpected substantial 
causes which themselves cause the insured event. 
The place of exclusions in this descriptive process is worth 
special comment, since an exclusion often presupposes the exist-
ence of concurrent causation, and since there has been some con-
fusion about the proper use of exclusions in the decided cases.56 
Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that underwriters employ 
exclusions for a variety of purposes. Their most common employ-
ment is to protect the insurer against the payment of indemnity in 
the event of the occurrence of certain causes of loss in conjunction 
with the insured cause. Thus, as will be seen below, it will usually 
56 For a flagrant example of the failure to understand the function of exclusions, see 
World Fire &: Marine Ins. Co. v. Carolina Mills Distr. Co., 169 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1948). 
An interesting and perceptive discussion of exclusions may be found in United Life, Fire 
&: Marine Ins. Co. v. Foote, 22 Ohio St. 340 (1872). 
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be desired in a fire insurance policy to exclude payment for fires 
caused by war. In addition, exclusions are commonly used to avoid 
certain consequences of an insured loss. In fire contracts, for ex-
ample, it may be necessary to avoid payment for the extra expense 
caused by the requirements of a building code. Finally, exclusions 
are found to be used for a mixed bag of purposes which could 
better be accomplished elsewhere in the contract, such as the 
elimination of coverage on a portion of the insured property. The 
economic factors behind the use of exclusions are equally varied: 
the excluded hazard may be considered uninsurable, or it may be 
desired to leave it out of this particular contract, or it may be 
covered under a different form of insurance. 
There is some initial question whether the words "exclusion" 
and "exception" are, or ought to be, synonymous. In most fire and 
casualty policies "exclusion" is used to designate the section con-
taining certain causes, conditions, or results which the undenvriter 
for one reason or another does not intend to cover, while an "ex-
ception" is usually found in the text of the policy in the form of a 
dependent clause beginning with the word "excepting" and used 
to limit a specific grant of coverage. It is the opinion of the ,vriter 
that no difference is intended. 
A more sophisticated approach to these two words has been 
taken by Professor Patterson.57 He distinguishes between "ex-
cepted causes," which are causes of the insured event, and "ex-
cluded events," which are the results of the insured event, and 
which constitute a part of the loss which the insurer does not ·wish 
to cover. The presence of an "excepted cause" is fatal to coverage 
only if it precedes and causes the insured event; if it is caused by 
the insured event, or appears in any other position, it is without 
consequence. 
An example will clarify the distinction. Suppose collision to 
be an excepted cause in a policy insuring an automobile against 
fire. In that event, following Patterson's rule, no coverage would 
exist for damage resulting from a fire caused by collision. But in 
the event that the fire took place while the vehicle was operating 
and caused the collision, the entire damage would be covered. 
Suppose, in the alternative, that collision is an "excluded event" 
under the same policy. In that event, damage resulting from a 
57 PATIERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw 249 (2d ed. 1957). For an interesting 
commentary on the terminology, see Keeton, Book Review. of Patterson, supra, 86 TEX. L. 
REv. 545 (1958). 
1961] CAUSATION IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 1163 
fire caused by collision would be covered, although it is well to 
keep in mind that the value destroyed by fire is the value of the 
car following the collision. But if the fire caused the collision, 
recovery would be limited to the fire damage itself and would not 
include the damage caused by the collision. 
So brief a description must of necessity deal unfairly with this 
system of terminology. It is founded on the unquestioned fact, 
mentioned above, that exclusions are in practice used to eliminate 
causes as well as consequences. Patterson has devised terms which 
aptly describe this contrast. No student of this field can have 
anything but sympathy for an attempt to make the vocabulary of 
the insurance contract more concise and accurate. 
To the ·writer, however, Patterson's terminology is not an en-
tirely satisfactory answer. The distinction between "exception" 
and "exclusion" is foreign to the actual use of those words in 
contracts of insurance, where they appear to have a roughly equiva-
lent meaning. This is unfortunate, since one is necessarily tempted 
to use Patterson's rule as a guide to interpretation in hard cases; 
it is of course nothing of the kind, being simply a classification 
which, like the classification of causes in this article, is useful for 
discussion and analysis. The insight into the dual nature of exclu-
sions, however, is important, and Patterson has performed a service 
in emphasizing it; whether the terminology adds anything is open 
to greater question. 
There is a certain surface inconsistency about the whole con-
cept of exclusions. One may state, at the risk of redundancy, that 
an underwriter excludes acts of war from a fire policy because he 
does not wish to pay for loss caused by risks of war. In simplified 
form, the policy states: "This policy covers loss caused by fire. It 
does not cover loss caused by act of war." There is of course a 
literal contradiction in this statement if one adheres to the theory 
that a single proximate cause exists which can be selected by known 
rules. Under this theory, it is apparent that coverage exists only 
if fire is the proximate cause; if the proximate cause should prove 
to be an act of war, no coverage exists, and the exclusion is 
superfluous. 
But common sense tells us the matter is not quite so simple. 
What the underwriter fears is a situation in which fire is indeed a 
substantial cause of loss, but in which an act of war is a concurrent 
cause, preceding and probably causing the fire, and creating a 
financial loss which is outside the scope of the rate. A more precise 
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way to state the same agreement and exclusion would be: "This 
policy covers loss caused by fire. It does not cover loss caused by 
fire in the event that an act of war is a concurrent cause." What 
the exclusion says is that an act of war, if one is present as a sub-
stantial cause, shall always be deemed the responsible cause. 
Sometimes the need for exclusions is debatable. In answering 
the question, it is of some assistance to ask whether a problem in 
concurrent causation is likely to occur. In other words, is the 
objectionable event likely to appear as a substantial cause of the 
loss together with the insured event, or is the chance so remote 
that the interests of brevity and clarity of policy language should 
prevail? To take the extreme case, one need not exclude the perils 
of the sea in a policy insuring grmving crops against damage by 
hail. But there are more equivocal cases. The question of whether 
flood should be excluded is currently under discussion by insurers 
of power plant equipment. Flood waters can, under certain physi-
cal conditions, cause the breaking or bursting or burning out of 
equipment which is insured under the policy. Yet the rate con-
templates only insurance against normal operating hazards, not 
against the results of great natural catastrophes. 
An excluded cause may appear in an unusual or unexpected 
position in the sequence of events. Upon these occasions, the con-
siderations motivating the underwriter to exclude a certain cause 
which customarily appears in one relationship to the insured cause 
might have less force when it appears in another. To take the 
extreme case again for clarity, the exclusion of flood preceding a 
fire is entirely comprehensible, in view of the impairment of fire 
protection and other factors, but the exclusion of flood following 
or caused by fire, a rare occurrence at best, would have little to 
support it. In this type of case the exclusion should leave no doubt 
as to the sequence of causation which is intended. 
There may, of course, be events which require exclusion if 
they are a substantial cause of loss in any temporal or physical 
sequence whatsoever. An excellent example of this occurs in the 
boiler and machinery policy, where it is desirable for historical 
reasons to exclude all loss caused by fire, whether coming before 
or after an insured accident. A double exclusion is used, as follows: 
(a) Fire concomitant with or following an accident or from 
the use of water or other means to extinguish fire. 
(b) An accident caused directly or indirectly by fire or from 
the use of water or other means to extinguish fire. 
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What, then, can be hoped or expected from the insurance 
draftsman with respect to exclusions? A recognition of the fact 
that an exclusion always deals with a problem of concurrent cau-
sation, which is to say with events which are associated in some 
way or other with the insured event in the production of loss, 
would seem to be a reasonable expectation. We may perhaps also 
expect some expert knowledge of which events, falling in this 
category, make the contract of insurance unsatisfactory, either in 
principle, or at the existing rate, or for some other reason. We 
may hope for some professional skill in separating events of this 
sort which are reasonably likely and thus worthy of mention from 
those which are improbable and whose presence merely clutters 
the contract. In short, we may hope for written recognition of 
most of those causes which, when associated with the insured 
event, make the insurance contract impossible on a continuing 
basis. 
VI. PUBLIC POLICY IN THE SELECTION OF CAUSES: TORT VS. 
INSURANCE 
From the very beginning legal scholars have been aware that 
the rule of proximate cause applied to negligence cases was not 
the same rule as that to be applied in insurance cases, or damages, 
or determination of criminal acts. This appears to have been 
Bacon's view. He perceived that the nature of the action was an 
important element in judging the proximity of the cause; it was 
to be narrowly construed in civil matters, while "this rule holdeth 
not in criminal acts, except they have a full interruption; because 
when the intention is matter of substance and that which the law 
doth principally behold, there the first motive will be principally 
regarded, and not the last impulsion."58 
In the various editions of Broom's commentaries on the maxims 
covering the period 1845 to 1939, some reflection of this can be 
found,59 but little emphasis is given to the point because of the 
dominance of marine insurance cases among those cited for appli-
cation of the rule under English law. Theophilus Parsons, a con-
temporary of Dr. Broom's in our own country, gives passing recog-
nition to policy considerations in his treatise on contracts by stating 
that it is applied with greater strictness in insurance cases than 
tiS Bacon, op. cit. supra note 26, at 329. 
rm BROOM, MAXIMS 148 (10th ed. 1939). 
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in computing damages for breach of conduct, adding wistfully 
"but the difficulty and uncertainty of its application are equally 
great in both cases."60 It remained for Professor Nicholas St. John 
Green, in an article on the First Maxim written for the American 
Law Review, to state the general effect of the question upon the 
cause in such graphic terms that one wonders that it could ever 
be doubted again: 
"For each different purpose with which we investigate we 
shall find a different circumstance, which we shall then in-
telligibly and properly call the cause. The man may have 
committed suicide; we say he himself was the cause of his 
death. He may have been pushed into the water by another; 
we say that other person was the cause. The dro,;rned man 
may have been blind, and have fallen in while his attendant 
was wrongfully absent: we say the negligence of his attend-
ant was the cause. Suppose him to have been drowned at a 
ford which was unexpectedly swollen by rain: we may prop-
erly say that the height of the water was the cause of his death. 
A medical man may say that the cause of his death was suffoca-
tion by water entering the lungs. A comparative anatomist 
may say that the cause of his death was the fact that he had 
lungs instead of gills like a fish. The illustration might be 
carried to an indefinite extent. From every point of view 
from which we look at the facts, a new cause appears. "61 
In more recent years the attention of courts and writers has 
turned largely to proximate causation in tort cases, and once 
again the dominance of one type of case has tended to obscure 
the effect of the case upon the rule. But the point has not gone 
unnoticed. Judge Cardozo observed that there is a tendency in 
tort law to go "farther back" than in insurance law.82 Reference 
is made by Professors McLaughlin63 and Carpenter64 to the dif-
ference in the application of rules of proximate cause to contract 
and tort cases, the former being primarily a question of the in-
tent of the parties; but the contract question referred to is ap-
parently that of determining the consequences of a breach rather 
than the application of an insurance contract. 
80 2 PARSONS, CoNTRAcrs 451, n. (p) (3d ed. 1857). 
61 Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 AM. L. REv. 201, 212 (1870). 
62 Bird v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918). 
63 McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARv. L. REv. 149, 151 (1925). 
64 Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CAL. L. R.Ev. 229, 
258 (1932). 
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Dean Leon Green was acutely aware of the problem and an-
alyzed the difference between causation in torts and in criminal 
matters at length. His conclusion was that no dependable rules 
of causation existed, but that liability rested on fact patterns 
which developed more or less independently in each area of the 
law.611 
In a recent article on the concept of cause-in-fact, or actual 
cause, 66 Professor Malone recognizes that the result of any in-
quiry into causation is profoundly affected by the purpose of the 
inquiry, citing the different conclusions which might be reached 
by a doctor and a judge concerning the cause of a heart attack. 
In Professor Malone's eyes, causation is one vehicle by which pub-
lic policy is brought to bear on the decision of cases. This is 
useful insight and a good way of stating the situation. 
Among the decided cases, it is generally taken to be beyond 
dispute that proximate cause is proximate cause, whenever it may 
be found, and the court is content with a brief definition in the 
traditional manner. The rule in insurance cases appears to be 
that the definition of proximate cause which should be applied 
is the same or substantially the same67 as in negligence cases; a 
few cases qualify this by saying that foreseeability is not required 
in insurance matters;68 often the question is not even raised. 
Yet an examination of what courts have actually done in these 
cases, as distinguished from what they have said, leads inevitably 
to the conclusion that there is no single proximate cause for all 
purposes. Any one of the many events in the causal network may 
be significant in given circumstances. To ask the question: "Which 
is the responsible cause?" is always to ask: "Who is liable under 
this contract? Did the defendant commit a breach of his duty to 
the plaintiff? What is the measure of damages? Is the insurer 
obligated to pay under this policy? Is the defendant guilty of 
this crime?" or other particular questions. The rules and pre-
cedents for answering these particular questions have grown sep-
arately and distinctly from the requirements of each particular 
factual pattern. Variations in the rules reflect variations in the 
social requirements of the pattern to which they apply. It is in 
the historical development of these rules that an opportunity 
61! Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation? 77 U. PA. L. REv. 601 (1929). 
66 Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956). 
67 Lynn Gas and Elec. Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 33 N.E. 690 (1893). 
68 E.g., Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Raley, 109 S.W. 2d 972 (Tex. Com. App. 1937). 
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exists for considerations of social policy to influence the selec-
tion of responsible cause, and it is clear that the rules which 
have been developed do reflect such considerations in almost every 
field in which causation problems occur. 
Once our attention is directed to this problem, numerous ex-
amples of actual litigation can be discovered where the respon-
sible cause would be or actually has been69 different depending 
on the issue in litigation. One graphic illustration of this point 
is Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R.R.70 Here 
plaintiff's mill was adjacent to defendant's track. Fire broke out, 
and when firemen rushed to the scene, they found it necessary to 
lay a hose line across defendant's track from the water supply to 
the burning building. Their efforts to contain the fire would 
have been successful had not a train crew of defendant knowingly 
run a train across the hose line, thus cutting the water supply. 
Plaintiff is permitted to recover in tort on the ground that de-
fendant's action was the responsible cause of the loss. No one 
would seriously question, however, that in an action on a fire 
policy the fire would be the responsible cause of the loss. 
Another way to illustrate this is to look at different examples 
of litigation on similar facts. It is well established, for example, 
that loss resulting from an explosion caused by a "friendly fire" 
does not fall within the coverage of a fire insurance policy ex-
cluding explosions since the explosion is regarded as a responsible 
cause of the loss.71 On the other hand, in a suit by a landlord 
against a tenant for negligence resulting in an explosion of the 
same nature, where the lease provided that the tenant would not 
be liable for damage caused by fire, it has been held that the 
friendly fire was the responsible cause and the tenant not liable.72 
Each result is justifiable in its own context. 
Modern examples of this point are frequently seen when a 
fire insurer pays a loss on the ground that fire was the responsible 
cause, perhaps after litigation of this point, and then by way of 
subrogation brings an action against a third party seeking re-
69 For an example of a case in which the court recognizes the policy distinctions 
applicable to the interpretation of identical words ("perils of the sea") and the differing 
consequences flowing therefrom in a bill of lading and a marine insurance policy, see 
The G. R. Booth, 171 U.S. 450 (1898). 
70 109 Mass. 277 (1872). 
71 Briggs v. North Am. & Mercantile Ins. Co., 53 N.Y. 446 (1873): Mitchell v. Potomac 
Ins. Co., 183 U.S. 42 (1901). The term "friendly fire" is generally used to designate a fire 
which is in its intended place, such as a candle flame or furnace fire. 
72 Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Feaster, 259 F.2d 210 (10th Cir. 1958). 
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coupment on the ground that the loss was caused by the defend-
ant's negligence. 
In General Mills, Inc. v. Goldman,78 a case which had a con-
siderable impact both on the insurance industry and on the draft-
ing of commercial leases,74 a factory building owned by plaintiff 
was destroyed by fire as the result of the negligence of one of de-
fendant's employees. Plaintiff recovered the sound value of the 
building under his insurance policy, and then was successful in 
the United States District Court in making a further recovery 
against the defendant tenant which was sufficient in amount to 
reimburse the insurer by way of subrogation and leave a comfort-
able margin for the plaintiff himself. The fire insurer paid the 
loss on the ground that it was caused by fire, while the lower 
court found for plaintiff on the ground that the identical loss was-
occasioned by the negligence of defendant's servant. Ultimately 
the case was reversed on grounds not associated with causation, 
but it remains an excellent example of how, without even think-
ing of the question, the rules of causation are applied by courts in 
different ways in different cases. 
Variations between the applicable rules of causation occur not 
only between fields of law but within the field of tort law itself. 
A negligence case ostensibly seeks to answer a simple question: 
Was the defendant's act or omission the responsible cause of plain-
tiff's injury? The difficulty, as modern commentators have pointed 
out,75 lies in the use of the question to cover up a miscellaneous 
lot of moral, social, and practical considerations which had better 
be stated directly. For example: An act which is offensive to so-
ciety or criminal in nature will be considered as the efficient cause 
of injury in cases where a merely negligent act would be too re-
mote, for reasons which are clearly punitive. Or an act occurring 
during the manufacturing of a product, though remote in time 
and space, may be considered as the cause of ultimate injury be-
cause the manufacturer is in the best position to spread the cost 
of inevitable injury over the entire use of the product. Such con-
siderations as these are entirely proper and relevant to the ques-
tion of tort liability; trouble arises only when general causation 
language is permitted to obscure the true nature of the inquiry. 
78184 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1950). 
74 See generally Brewer, An Inductive Approach to the Liability of the Tenant for 
Negligence, 31 B.UL. REv. 47 (1951). 
75 E.g., PROSSER, TORTS 218-19 (2d ed. 1955); Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 15 So. CAL. 
L. REv. 187, 193 (1942). 
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Whether expressed or not, it is these moral, social, and prac-
tical criteria which control the development of negligence law, 
and in particular the selection of the responsible cause. Permit-
ting a "classic" definition of proximate cause to flow from the 
large body of negligence law to the smaller body of insurance 
law tends to carry over these policy objectives into insurance, 
where they are usually inapplicable and unwelcome. If respon-
sible cause is only that cause which we may choose to designate 
in the light of other criteria, we have a right to expect that a 
major change in the criteria will bring a change in the doctrine. 
Development of suitable criteria for the selection of causes is 
actually not so difficult a matter in the smaller and more homo-
geneous field of insurance law as it is in tort law. A great variety 
of sociological, economic, and political factors touch upon the 
question of redress for legal injuries. The insurance relationship 
has its complications, to be sure, but it at least has a single ob-
jective: the provision of a suitable legal framework for the shar-
ing of financial hazards.76 In this context any rule of interpreta-
tion, and especially a rule dealing with the quicksands of causation, 
should be as simple and predictable as the subject will permit. 
Whether a suggested rule is suitable or not must be judged 
both from the standpoint of the public and the insurance com-
panies. With respect to the public interest, one may ask whether 
the rule will contribute to the understanding of insurance con-
tracts, and whether it is consistent with the general expectations 
of the insurance buyer. The interest of the companies lies in es-
tablishing a rule which will encourage accurate draftsmanship and 
permit a reasonable predictability of consequences, although, since 
these matters directly concern the solvency of the insurer, they 
have a public aspect as well. 
There are, in broad terms, two ways of approaching the prob-
lem of choosing between concurrent causes. One way, which is 
an extension of the rule of interpretation of ambiguous contractual 
provisions under general contract law, is to require that the selec-
76 Lack of such definite policy considerations in certain other areas where causation 
is a problem makes the selection of the responsible cause more difficult, and the contrast 
is illuminating. In such cases "common sense is .•• the only test that can be applied to 
the choice between several causes, all of which are sufficient in law." Royal Greek Gov-
ernment v. Minister of Transport, 66 T.L.R. 504, 514 (1949) (interpretation of charter 
party). The temptation to bring rules of decision based on irrelevant social policies into 
such "neutral" cases is almost overwhelming, but can and should be resisted. See, e.g., 
The G. R. Booth, 171 U.S. 450 (1898) (insurance rules distinguished from rules applicable 
to bill of lading). 
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tion be made on a basis consistent with the expectation of the 
reasonable buyer. This is often preceded by a finding that the 
policy contract is ambiguous by reason of the existence of con-
current causes, followed by the customary ruling that ambiguities 
are to be construed in favor of the insured, which in turn is usu-
ally in accordance with his reasonable expectations. The alterna-
tive rule, here advocated, and supported, perhaps unwittingly, by 
the majority of cases, is that the selection be dependent upon 
whether or not a concurrent cause of loss is specifically excluded, 
with recovery being denied only in cases where such a specific ex-
clusion exists. 
Assuming that such a rule meets general community standards 
of fairness, it is suggested that the most important single factor to 
be used in appraising it should be the nature of the public re-
quirements for insurance protection. Today this means increas-
ingly elaborate contracts offering a variety of coverages within the 
same instrument. The trend is relevant to the selection of caus-
ation rules because of the difficulties of understanding which it 
places in the way of the purchaser and the technical difficulties 
it presents to the draftsman. As will be seen below, it is the 
opinion of the author that this trend points clearly toward the 
use of rules of law which have the greatest degree of clarity and 
predictability, even though some initial sophistication may be 
needed for their application. 
A brief consideration of the technical difficulties is a good 
place to start since it helps to illuminate the fundamental prob-
lem. Drafting the modern insurance contract is a task to be ap-
proached with humility. In the past, changes in such contracts 
took place slowly, as by evolution; the draftsman was rarely called 
upon to venture far from the welUitigated clauses and concepts 
with which he was familiar. But it is not an exaggeration to say 
that the insurance business today is in process of revolution. New 
contracts, for the most part of the multiple peril or all-risk type, 
are appearing on the market in such large numbers that even 
careful students of the business have difficulty in keeping abreast 
of them. It is doubtful if the business ·will ever return to the sta-
bility of previous days when such contracts as the New York stand-
ard fire insurance policy, on which practically all the fire insurance 
in the country ·was written, were interpreted by the courts in 
minute detail over a period of many years. The standard policy 
is still an important factor but the direction is clear. New Ian-
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guage and new coverages, untested by the courts and unfamiliar 
to the buyer, are the order of the day. 
In this confused situation, simple contract forms, using lan-
guage of known consequences, are less and less to be found. In 
actual practice, the words which are being created by draftsmen 
today are perforce intended for the eye of the professional, not 
for the ordinary buyer. They are intended for agents, brokers, 
insurance advisers, corporate insurance buyers, company person-
nel, and all the others who might generally be classified as pro-
fessionals, including that most important person, the judge who 
may ultimately preside over the litigation of the contract. Today 
the ordinary buyer, even one who might be considered a skilled 
amateur of the art, receives his information about the content of 
an insurance policy from promotional material, independent serv-
ices, oral statements, and other sources. than the contract itself. His 
information is, in brief, second-hand. 
It is very doubtful that the future will bring any improve-
ment in this respect. While the rhetoric employed by representa-
tives of insurance companies often lacks the grace and precision 
which one might hope for it, its standards are nonetheless as high 
as those of the business community generally. Perhaps it is going 
too far to say that the contracts which are in growing use today 
cannot under any circumstances be drafted in language which 
can be read with understanding by the unsophisticated, but in 
the opinion of the author they are unlikely to be. Even a passing 
glance at one of the popular homeowners' policies77 will suggest 
the difficulties involved. 
If this is the case, then the non-professional buyer cannot be 
expected to know the details of what he is buying without com-
petent advice. Regrettable though it is, the situation is not unique. 
To take one of many examples, the purchaser of goods, knowing 
only the broad terms of the transaction, may sign an installment 
contract whose provisions represent even more of a legal thicket 
than the insurance policy, aware as he does so that his ignorance 
would not generally be considered a defense to its enforcement. 
His conduct is not as unreasonable as it would seem. The public 
benefits of credit, and of insurance as well, outweigh the occa-
77 This phrase is used generally in the insurance industry to describe a policy con• 
taining several types of coverage formerly purchased in separate policies by homeowners. 
There are numerous forms available today, but in all cases the principal hazards insured 
are fire, windstorm, theft, and public liability. 
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sional embarrassment to the individual arising from the applica-
tion of unforeseen contractual provisions. 
These facts suggest that some revision may be needed in the 
traditional attitude of the courts that a policy is either, on the 
one hand, intelligible reading for the man in the street, or, on 
the other hand, ambiguous. A more reasonable approach today 
would be to require that the policy language be meaningful to 
the type of professional, such as an agent, who is readily available 
to the public for advice on such matters, as well as to the court 
itself. Such a standard would seem to offer as great a degree of 
information to the buyer through the policy language as can be 
permitted in view of the sophistication of today's drafting require-
ments. Judged by this standard, the rule of concurrency that 
recovery is allowed except in the presence of an excluded cause 
seems to be sufficiently clear and predictable, having in mind the 
inherent difficulties of causation itself. While the alternative rule 
based on reasonable expectations has a surface clarity, it is likely 
in practice to be more capricious and therefore less comprehen-
sible in depth than the suggested doctrine. 
It is perfectly true that no rule of law, however appealing in 
theory, can survive unless it produces a result which is some-
where close to the expectation of the average buyer, albeit on 
an ex post facto basis. It is doubtful, however, if the possibility 
of concurrent causes is ever actually considered in advance. If 
it should be, about all that can be said is that the normal buyer 
would expect to be paid if an insured event occurred unless fore-
warned to the contrary. This test is met quite nicely by the sug-
gested rule. Selection of causes is an intellectual exercise at best, 
and there is not much to be found in the periphery of an ordinary 
insurance transaction to evidence intention concerning what is 
at best an unlikely eventuality. 
It is sometimes suggested that the premium charged should 
be taken into account in determining the expectation of the buyer 
with respect to the choice between concurrent causes. Thus if a 
certain cause of loss was included in the experience on which the 
premium was based, coverage should be provided regardless of 
the policy language. This argument, while of course based on 
hypothetical expectation rather than actual, the ordinary buyer 
having no actual knowledge of how premiums are computed, has 
the initial appeal of fairness and impartiality. In point of fact, 
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however, it offers very little assistance in specific cases because of 
the way in which premiums are determined. 
In brief, most insurance premiums today are computed by 
the companies as a group acting through rating bureaus and 
based upon pooled experience. It is important to note the signi-
ficance of the word "experience." It means the dollar amount 
paid by the companies with respect to certain hazards under con-
tracts then in use. Perhaps more important, it does not mean the 
actual incidence of such hazards or their cost. This is an import-
ant distinction, since it means that the rating bureaus have no 
opportunity to reflect their desires with respect, for example, to 
the settlement of claims involving concurrent causes in the formu-
lation of rates, but are bound merely to use the accumulated 
judgment of companies and courts in such matters in the form 
of experience. To this factor, also called the "pure" loss expense, 
is added an increment for expenses and profit in order to deter-
mine the premium. It is impossible to find in this figure any 
guidance with respect to concurrent causation problems in spe-
cific cases, since there is no available evidence of the average set-
tlement practices on which it is based. As a result it is an un-
satisfactory element to introduce into the applicable rule of law. 
It would appear, therefore, that from the point of view of both 
public understanding and expectation, the suggested doctrine is 
an acceptable one. 
From the standpoint of the insurer, any convention which 
makes the policy language more precise and its financial conse-
quences more predictable is to be welcomed. There is, as men-
tioned above, an area in which the risk of concurrent causation 
is deliberately run for the sake of brevity, or perhaps as a talking 
point in the competitive struggle. But when the decision is made 
to exclude a given hazard it is of the greatest importance to find 
language which ·will actually accomplish the task. 
One of the minor but legitimate objectives of a rule of law 
in this area is the encouragement of good drafting by rewarding 
clarity when it appears and penalizing deficiencies in their turn. 
Some thinking of this sort no doubt lies behind the well-known 
rule that ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer. But 
if such a rule is to be applied the draftsman must have a fair chance. 
In the case of concurrent causes, the draftsman is entitled to know 
that a properly drafted exclusion will stick, but that a missing or 
inaccurate exclusion will result in coverage. 
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VII. THE CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANTIAL CAUSES 
A desire to classify and systematize is a characteristic of those 
who attempt to deal ·with causation. Like the desire for a private 
vocabulary, it is an indication of the philosophical overtones of 
the subject. For those who would look further into the classifica-
tion of causes in tort cases and the rules for selection of the re-
sponsible cause, Professor Carpenter's series of articles78 is rec-
ommended both as a summary of past thinking and original 
contribution to the subject. 
There is indeed much to recommend the use of a classifica-
tion of some sort in dealing with difficult conceptual problems of 
this kind. Causation itself is as elusive as a drop of mercury. 
Causation concepts are hard to grasp and hard to describe in 
simple language. Not everything can be considered at once; com-
partments must be provided to hold surplus questions while each 
in turn is placed before us. Thus relieved of clutter, the mind 
can give its attention to the narrow point, and develop rules 
which are of some help in the particular rather than the general 
case. 
It is intended to deal here ·with insurance cases in which two 
or more substantial causes exist from which one responsible cause 
must be chosen. These concurrent causation problems fall, as 
we have seen, into two broad categories. In the first category, 
one of the substantial causes is always the subject of a specific 
policy exclusion or exception. In the second, one of the sub-
stantial causes falls outside the coverage set forth in the contract, 
but no specific exclusion is applicable. This basic division is of 
the greatest importance, and is the proper starting point for any 
analysis of a concurrent causation problem. 
In addition, each of these two categories may be broken down 
into three further classifications, reflecting the temporal sequence 
and causal relationship of the events which constitute substantial 
causes. Other classifications could be suggested, but these seem 
sufficient for practical use. There is no magic in classification. 
It is merely an aid to clear thought, and a check-list by which 
one can test proposed rules of substance. 
The three classifications proposed reflect three common fact 
situations. In the first, the insured event precedes and causes 
the event which is outside the coverage. In the second, this se-
78 Note 37 supra. 
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quence is reversed, and the event outside the coverage precedes 
and causes the insured event. In the third case, two independent 
events join in causing the insured loss, neither being sufficient 
to produce it alone; here the time sequence does not have par-
ticular significance. Note that in all three the event which is 
outside the coverage may be outside because of an exclusion or 
because it is simply not covered. 
To illustrate, assume that A is the substantial cause or event 
which is within the coverage, and that B is the event which is 
outside. 
First, A and B, which are independent of each other, 
join to cause the loss. 
Example: Under a marine insurance policy, the in-
sured vessel is damaged by enemy action 
(B). Later the vessel is sunk by storm 
(A), but would not have sunk had it not 
been first damaged by the enemy. 
Second, A may precede and cause B, and B causes the loss. 
Example: Under a fire insurance policy, a fire oc-
curs (A), eventually causing an explo-
sion (B) which destroys the building. 
Third, B may precede and cause A, and A causes the loss. 
Example: Under a fire insurance policy, an explo-
sion occurs (B), causing a fire (A) which 
destroys the building. 
In considering a case involving concurrent causation, it is 
worth the effort to place the factual situation in one of these three 
classes. While it is suggested that the presence or absence of an 
excluded event is in the long run the determining factor, there 
are noticeable differences in the treatment given by courts to the 
three proposed classes of facts, and it is important to consider 
whether these differences are justified. 
VIII. THE LAW TODAY 
Measured by frequency, the problem of concurrent causation 
in insurance is not of great importance. Its interest comes from 
the fact that it forces the court to face up to the selection of a 
responsible cause, state the "nicest discriminations"79 on which it 
79 " ••• [W]e would regard it as unprofitable labor to seek through the cases for a 
satisfactory expression of the rule, since no general rule will be found suited to all 
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is to be done, and thus illuminate the rationale of decision in 
other more numerous and less difficult cases. 
In one recent case decided by the New York Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division,80 the problem is illustrated with great clar-
ity, although the decision is difficult to justify. Lekas Company 
is the lessee of a loft building containing a freight elevator. It 
received from Travelers a standard form of liability insurance 
policy covering its operations on the premises but excluding ele-
vators, which term is defined as including the elevator shaft. 
An employee of a tenant brings the action against Lekas alleg-
ing that he fell into an unguarded elevator shaft as the result 
of the failure of Lekas to maintain a proper light in the corridor. 
Travelers refused to assume the defense of the resulting ac-
tion. In due course a verdict is rendered against Lekas, which 
Travelers refused to pay. The present action was brought to 
recover the amount of the judgment plus attorneys' fees and 
costs. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and both mo-
tions were denied. The precise question considered on appeal 
was whether Travelers was entitled to summary judgment on the 
ground that the accident was caused by an elevator as a matter 
of law, or whether the trial court was correct in ordering the is-
sues to be tried on the ground that the choice between the ab-
sence of light and the elevator as causative factors was for the 
finder of fact. 
In considering this question the court apparently assumed 
from the record of the negligence action that absence of light in 
the hall, a factor which would fall within the policy if found to 
be the responsible cause, was a substantial cause of the accident. 
Without actually deciding the issue, a majority of the court held 
that the question of causation was a trial issue. While this bare 
holding has importance, the interest of the case lies in its gratuitous 
analysis of concurrent causation. 
As a starting point for the solution of the problem, the court 
quotes the rule concerning ambiguous draftsmanship: 
"It will be seen at once that in arguable areas of coverage 
where there has been conjunctive causation of the casualty, 
one element of cause within, and one without the policy, the 
conditions, and each case, as it arises, must, after all, be decided upon the special facts 
belonging to it, and often upon the very nicest discriminations." The German Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Roost, 55 Ohio St. 581, 584, 45 N.E. 1097, 1099 (1897). 
so Lekas Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 147 N.Y.S.2d 60 (App. Div. 1955). 
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ruling has frequently gone against the carrier; and this upon 
the common principle of construction favoring the assured 
in reading an instrument prepared by the insurer."81 
For this rule five cases are cited and described, of which two 
are illustrations of concurrent causation, and three are really con-
cerned with the meaning of policy terms. In the first category is 
a holding by the New York Court of Appeals that an automobile 
fire insurance policy which excludes loss caused by collision pro-
vides coverage where the driver was blinded by smoke from the 
burning car and as a result thereof suffered a collision. 82 Also 
pertinent is a case which refuses to apply the exclusion of death 
resulting directly from flight in an aircraft to an insured who was 
killed by enemy fire while in a military aircraft.83 Illustrative of 
the other category is a holding that the work of putting a new 
roof on a house, replacing old siding shingles, and removing 
a porch were not "structural alterations" within the policy 
exclusion.84 
Attention is then turned to the important case of Marcus v. 
United States Gas. Co.,85 which was decided for the insurer by 
the authoritative tribunal in New York upon very similar facts 
involving a fall into an elevator shaft, and might have been ex-
pected to conclude the Lekas case. The court deals with this case, 
however, by pointing out first that the fall in Marcus was caused 
by the mistaken belief that the elevator shaft was a toilet, instead 
of by the absence of light. This observation does not completely 
dispose of the Marcus case, however; in addition to the actual 
holding, there is a dictum which is almost prophetically relevant 
to Lekas: 
"We cannot imagine that the parties in using these words 
understood that if a person fell do·wn the shaft because the 
hallway was dark, the bodily injuries would be sustained by 
reason of the darkness, not because of the elevator shaft."86 
This dictum is answered in Lekas by the statement that there was 
no "element of darkness" in the Marcus case, and that it is merely 
"comment." Furthermore, "the cases on conjunctive causation 
in touching on exclusion clauses seem to point uniformly in quite 
81 Id. at 63-64. 
82Tonkin v. California Ins. Co., 294 N.Y. 326 (1945). 
83 Riche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 Misc. 557 (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
84 Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Frazier, 183 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1950). 
85 249 N.Y. 21 (1928). 
86Jd. at 25. 
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a different direction." The implication is clear that coverage ex-
ists where one of the two substantial causes is excluded. 
One may doubt that the rule of ambiguity in insurance pol-
icies is of any real assistance in choosing one of two concurrent 
causes, or that the Marcus case may be so readily distinguished. 
But the case is useful because its facts are typical of modem cases 
on concurrent causation, and because the majority opinion illus-
trates the difficulty which many courts have in coming to grips 
with the issues involved. 
These issues, and, in the author's view, their proper answer, 
might be stated as follows: 
Issue: Is there more than one substantial cause involved? 
Answer: Yes, both the absence of light and the ex-
istence of the elevator shaft are substantial 
causes of the injury. 
Issue: Is one substantial cause excluded under the insurance 
contract? 
Answer: Injury caused by falling into elevator shafts 
is excluded. 
Issue: In such event, shall the selection of the responsible 
cause be for the jury or for the court? 
Answer: All the facts have been determined. The 
interpretation of the exclusion and the 
selection of the responsible cause is for the 
court. 
Issue: Which is the responsible cause in this case? 
Answer: Injury caused by elevators being specific-
ally excluded, the elevator shall be re-
garded as the responsible cause, and no 
coverage exists. 
A similar position was taken by a strong dissenting opinion 
in Lekas arguing that the existence of an excluded cause was 
sufficient to place the action outside the policy coverage and to 
grant summary judgment. 
The widely-quoted case of Leyland Shipping Co. v. Norwich 
Union Fire Ins. Soc'y,87 one of the many arising out of the marine 
insurance policy, enunciates the correct rule, but in the traditional 
language of proximate causation. It may be noted that in this 
87 32 T.L.R. 569 (1916), afj'd, [1917] 1 K.B. 873 (C.A.), afj'd, [1918] A.C. 350. Accord, 
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117 (1877). 
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case the excluded cause joins with the insured cause to cause the 
loss. 
In Leyland, the plaintiff's vessel was torpedoed in the North 
Sea during the first World War and made the port of Le Havre 
with her forward hatch flooded. She was at first berthed snugly 
at a quay, where she would have been safe, but a gale arose and 
the harbormaster was forced to move her to a more exposed an-
chorage. Being well below her marks due to the weight of water 
in her hold, she was unable to find sufficient depth, and struck 
bottom repeatedly in the trough of the seas. Eventually her back 
was broken, and she was declared a total loss. The question was 
whether her sinking was caused by hostilities, specifically ex-
cluded under the policy, or by the normal perils of the sea. 
In discussing the theoretical question, Lord Atkinson says: 
"The rule that in marine insurance policies the proximate, 
not the remote, causes are to be regarded is supposed to be 
based upon the intention of the contracting parties, to be 
gathered from the language of the contract itself, taken in con-
nection with the surrounding circumstances; but there is such 
a tendency in argument to treat concurrent causes as pre-
ceding and succeeding causes, the latter proximate, the former 
remote, and to split up complex causes into their compo-
nents and establish a sequence between them, that it is well 
always to bear in mind the warning given by Lindley L.J. 
in Reischer v. Borwich, that this rule of maritime insurance 
must be applied with good sense to give effect to, and not to 
defeat the intention of the contracting parties.''88 
The court then concluded that good sense clearly pointed to the 
torpedoing as the proximate cause of the sinking, despite the 
possibility of "prolonged and ingenious argument" on the sub-
ject, with the result that the insurer was not liable for the loss. 
The Leyland is typical of many cases in which the excluded 
event joins an insured event to cause the loss, neither being suf-
:fident to do so alone. In a more recent case of this type,80 plain-
tiff insured his house under what was then known as a standard 
tornado policy, covering loss by windstorm but excluding loss 
caused directly or indirectly by high water. Flood waters col-
lected around the insured house to a height of three feet. After 
several days, the waters were blown against the house by high 
88 [1918] A.C. at 365. 
80 National Fire Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 160 Ky. 802, 803 (1914). 
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winds, and the combined effect of these 1vaters and the wind 
itself caused the loss of the house. It was held that since "the 
two concurring causes brought about the damage which neither 
by itself alone would have produced," the loss must have been 
caused at least indirectly by high water, and there was no coverage. 
Less commonly, a case has appeared where the insured event 
precedes and causes the excluded event, which in turn causes 
the loss. In German Fire Ins. Co. v. Roost,90 for example, cov-
erage against the hazard of lightning was added by endorsement 
to a policy which contained an exclusion of damage caused by 
explosion unless fire ensued. Lightning struck a nearby house 
used to store powder, causing an explosion which destroyed plain-
tiff's property. After considering a "formidable array of deci-
sions" on proximate cause, the court found them to be of little 
help, and found for the defendant on the basis of the clear in-
tention of the policy. 
There has been a tendency, however, to find for the plaintiff 
in these cases where the insured event is first in time. Often 
proximate cause language is invoked with the insured event be-
ing designated as efficient and predominating, or as the continu-
ing cause. The outstanding example of this exception is the rule, 
now firmly established in the law, that an explosion which is 
caused by a hostile fire on the premises of the insured is covered 
under the standard fire insurance policy excluding loss caused 
by explosion. This represented the law prior to the adoption of 
the exclusion; apparently there was little desire on the part of 
the industry to avoid such losses, since the adoption of the ex-
clusion was intended to avoid losses caused by the "combustion" 
of gunpowder and flammable vapors.91 There was equally little 
desire to avoid losses caused by fire resulting from explosion, and 
when it was held92 that the exclusion had such an effect, the ex-
clusion was modified by inserting the phrase "unless fire ensue." 
In a recent Canadian case93 where an appeal was carried to 
the Privy Council, the policy covered pressure vessel explosions 
but excluded loss by fire. The insured operated a turpentine 
90 55 Ohio St. 581, 45 N.E. 1097 (1897). 
01 Scripture v. Lowell l\!ut. Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cush. 356 (Mass. 1852). 
ll2lnsurance Co. v. Tweed, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 44 (1868). A good account of these 
developments appears in Rosenberg, Explosions and the Fire Insurance Policy, J. Am. Ins., 
Feb. 1943, p. 5. 
93 Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co. of Canada v. Sherwin-·wmiams of Canada, Ltd., 
[1951] A.C. 319. 
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plant in which wood chips were distilled under pressure. Fol-
lowing the explosion of the vessel containing the chips, the tur-
pentine vapors filled the room, and were shortly ignited by some 
undetermined source, causing a visible flame in the air and an 
ensuing rapid combustion or explosion of the vapor which de-
stroyed the building. It was found that coverage existed. Pos-
sibly the court was influenced in this case by the question of 
whether the visible flame was actually a fire in the traditional 
sense, or merely evidence of a combustion explosion in the at-
mosphere. 
This tendency to find for the plaintiff where the insured 
cause precedes and causes the excluded cause has led to some 
precautionary activity among draftsmen.94 
The last type of case involving specific exclusions is that in 
which the excluded event causes the insured event. A recent 
case,95 correctly decided and with an element of humor, illus-
trates the recommended approach. Here a manufacturer of sau-
sages had insured himself against water damage under a policy 
which excluded explosion. A pressure vessel containing a large 
amount of sausage meat exploded, scattering the potential sau-
sages and breaking a sprinkler pipe, thus flooding the premises 
with a foot or two of water. Defendant was granted a directed 
verdict in the trial court. This was upheld by the appellate court 
on the simple ground that the explosion was the proximate cause 
of loss. It is implicit in the opinion that, once the facts have 
been determined, it is the function of the court to apply and 
interpret the insurance contract. Here the contract made it clear 
that explosion was not among the risks insured. One can specu-
late as to whether the outcome would have been different if the 
suit had been brought by a boiler and machinery insured who, 
having paid the loss, was seeking contribution by way of subro-
gation. 
While most courts have found for the defendant where the 
excluded event comes first,96 there have been numerous excep-
94 Newark Trust Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 237 Fed. 788 (3d Cir. 1916). 
95 Royal Sausage & Meat Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 Ohio App. 77, 117 N.E.2d 
207 (1954). 
96 E.g., St. John v. American Mut. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 11 N.Y. 516 (1854); com-
pare Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 44 (1868) (remoteness of excluded cause 
also an issue). 
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tions, and occasional changes in policy language have been neces-
sary in areas where coverage was not intended.97 
The application of these principles to a more complicated fact 
situation can be seen in the famous case of Ionides v. Universal 
Marine Ins. Co.,98 which combines the romance of the sea with an 
episode in the Civil War. Here insurance was written on a cargo 
of coffee to be carried by a New York vessel from Rio de Janeiro 
to New York "warranted free from all consequences of hostilities." 
During a period when the Cape Hatteras lighthouse had been ex-
tinguished by Confederate soldiers, the ship carrying the coffee 
went aground on the treacherous sands of the Cape. Part of the 
cargo was saved with the assistance of Federal troops who had 
returned to the scene, and more would have been salvaged had not 
the Confederates then returned to the area and driven off the 
Federal soldiers, with the result that the balance of the cargo was 
lost in the sea. 
There are two separate problems involved here. First, was the 
extinguishment of the light an excluded event which caused the 
insured event, the shipwreck? If so, it would appear that the Royal 
Sausage rule should apply. But instead the court held that the 
darkening of the light was too remote to be a substantial cause at 
all. "Can it be said that the absence of the light would have been 
followed by the loss of the ship, if the captain had not been out of 
his reckoning? It seems to me that these two events are too dis-
tantly connected with each other to stand in the relation of cause 
and effect. "99 
Second, did the ship·wreck and the raid of Confederate soldiers 
constitute two independent causes joining together to produce the 
loss of part of the cargo? If so, then the Leyland rule would appear 
to be applicable. The court did take this position by holding that 
the intervention by Confederate soldiers was within the warranty 
and the insurer was not liable. Recovery was therefore permitted 
for the value of the vessel but not for the lost cargo. 
In certain cases involving exclusions, the issue has reached the 
appellate court ·without a proper resolution of the facts by the trial 
97 See generally Carva Food Corp. v. Equitable Fire &: Marine Ins. Co., 261 F.2d 254, 
257 (4th Cir. 1958) (discussion of coverage of sprinkler leakage caused by windstorm). 
9814 C.B.N.S. 259, 143 Eng. Rep. 445 (1863). 
oo Id. at 285, 143 Eng. Rep. at 456. 
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court, so that a question exists as to whether the excluded cause 
was a substantial cause of the loss at all. This situation is not 
always recognized for what it is. As a result, though the disposition 
of the case may be sound, we are left with statements of unsound 
law which cause difficulty in future cases. Thus, in a case100 where 
the extent to which rain had contributed to a windstorm loss was 
clearly in doubt, the court states: "However, the policy expressly 
insured against 'all direct loss and damage by windstorm' and we 
are of the opinion that this coverage extends to losses where wind-
storm is a contributing cause." 
Bad draftsmanship has also played its part in this area. While 
it is the point of view of the writer that the draftsman is entitled 
to be read with some understanding of the problems of the busi-
ness, it is reasonable, in view of the greater capacity of the insurer 
to absorb and spread the results of such errors, that true ambigui-
ties created by defective drafting should be interpreted in favor 
of the policyholder, and this is the general rule. If, for example, 
one exclusion is qualified by the words "directly or indirectly," 
while another is not, a court is justified in limiting the application 
of the latter to a narrow compass.101 But it is important to under-
stand that the existence of concurrent causes does not create an 
ambiguity in an otherwise unobjectionable contract. 
There are two types of problems involving exclusions which 
have each generated a large number of cases in different courts 
over a period of years, and which, if a detailed study were desired, 
would provide excellent examples of different judicial approaches 
to the same subject. One of these is the fire-explosion series, in-
volving cases where fire caused explosion or explosion causes fire 
under a fire policy excluding explosion.102 The second is the 
windstorm-water damage series, where wind and water react with 
each other in various ways under windstorm policies excluding 
water damage and water damage policies excluding windstorm.103 
The other great line of cases dealing with complex causation 
includes those in which the choice of causes lies between an event 
which falls within the insuring agreement and one which, while 
100 Pearl Assur. Co. v. Stacey Bros. Gas Constr. Co., 114 F.2d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 1940). 
Accord, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hanley, 252 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1958). 
101 Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. v. Willard, 164 F. 404 (9th Cir. 1908). For an 
early case in which bad draftsmanship resulted in a finding for the defendant, see Evans 
v. Columbian Ins. Co., 44 N.Y. 146 (1870). 
102 See 6 CouCH, INSURANCE § 1279 (1930), for citations of representative cases. 
103 For an illustrative case containing a discussion of the history of the problem, sec 
Carva Food Corp. v. Equitable Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 261 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1958). 
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not specifically excluded, falls clearly outside it. We have seen 
that where one of the events was specifically excluded from the 
contract, there are considerations which suggest that the excluded 
event be considered as the responsible cause and no coverage af-
forded. But where neither is excluded, these considerations are 
absent, and both public policy and the cases suggest that the 
insured event be regarded as the responsible cause. The only 
exception to this statement lies in the fraud cases where the insured 
event is caused by the willful act of the insured, and public policy 
clearly requires that coverage be denied. An examination of the 
cases shows that decisions have, in general, followed this pattern, 
although, as in the exclusion cases, the policy reasons are not always 
well understood. 
No cases have been found dealing directly with the factual 
situation in which two unrelated events each contribute to the 
loss, one being insured and the other uninsured but not specifi-
cally excluded. No doubt problems of this type have arisen, but 
the relatively strong equities in favor of the insured may have 
contributed to the lack of litigation. An example might be in 
order. Suppose a commercial building to be partly destroyed by 
fire, leaving a wall standing. Shortly thereafter an unusual wind-
storm blows the wall down on an adjacent building.104 May the 
mmer of the adjacent building recover under his fire insurance 
policy? It would appear that he should. Windstorms are known 
to increase the hazard of fire or, as in this case, to augment the 
damage caused by fire. If it is desired to exclude loss in which 
windstorm is a factor, a specific exclusion is in order. 
Questions of complex causation of this type should be distin-
guished from questions of valuation. Using an example similar 
to that above, suppose a building which has been partially de-
stroyed by a windstorm, and is shortly thereafter destroyed by fire. 
May the mmer of the building recover for the full value thereof 
under his fire insurance policy? Here, unlike the above case, the 
loss to the insured caused by each event is readily distinguishable. 
He may recover only the value of the structure at the time of the 
fire, or in other words as it existed following the windstorm. 
A common type of case, and one which has presented little 
104 Russell v. German Fire Ins. Co., 100 Minn. 528, Ill N.W. 400 (1907), is identical 
with the assumed case except that the wind was of ordinary force. The case held for the 
plaintiff on the ground that, ~n essence, the wind was not a substantial cause. "The wind 
was not the cause, if it was an intervening agency which could reasonably have been 
foreseen." 
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difficulty to the courts, is one in which the first of the consecutive 
causes is the insured event, with the second and resulting event 
outside the contract but not specifically excluded. A typical exam-
ple is Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y v. Port of New Orleans.105 
A fire in a grain elevator resulted in damage to the machinery 
used to aerate the grain. Consulting the rule of proximate cause, 
the court found it to be of no consequence that the inherent 
properties of the grain caused the loss, and held that the damage 
was covered under a fire policy. This holding is straight-forward 
and clearly correct. 
In this situation, the insured event may come first and cause 
an intervening uninsured event, which itself is at some distance in 
time and space from the loss. If the discussion is in terms of 
proximate causation, the question of whether the insured cause is 
too remote to be a substantial cause of the loss may be mingled 
indistinguishably with the question of the choice between losses. 
Perhaps the greatest American case on this point, or at least the 
most unforgettable opinion, is Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co.106 Here Judge Cardozo, then on the New York Court of Ap-
peals, decided that a barge owner could not collect from his fire 
insurer for concussion damage from the distant Black Tom ex-
plosion, which itself had originated in a fire. He recognized that 
the problem of remoteness could be answered only by the context 
in which it had arisen, here an insurance contract. "In last analy-
sis, therefore, it is something in the minds of men, in the will of 
the contracting parties, and not merely in the physical bond of 
union between events, which solves, at least for the jurist, this 
problem of causation."107 To put the matter briefly, no one could 
expect to be paid for a fire that far off. 
Some complications appear when the event intervening be-
tween the insured cause and the loss is the voluntary or involun-
tary action of an individual. If confusion is present, it is likely 
that it arises from an erroneous comparison with tort cases in which 
there is an independent intervening force which may or may not 
be foreseen by the original actor. Thus, in an insurance case, if a 
fireman drops a jewel while attempting to rescue it from a fire,108 
105 141 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1944). 
106224 N.Y. 47,120 N.E. 86 (1918). 
101 Id. at 54. 
10s Mercury Ins. Co. v. Griffith, 178 Va. 9 (1941). 
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or a thief plunders a burning building,109 there is no reason to 
deny coverage. 
Princess Garment Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.110 presents 
an unusual example of that category of cases in which the unin-
sured event precedes and causes the insured event. Here the policy 
insured against fire, including the damage caused by the orders of 
military or civil authority to prevent the spread of fire. Plaintiff's 
factory was first inundated by flood waters. A nearby gasoline tank 
then burst, the contents ignited, and the flames, burning fiercely 
on the surface of the water, approached plaintiff's building. Upon 
order of the authorities, plaintiff's employees left the building for 
a place of safety. They were thus forced to abandon their work 
of carrying plaintiff's goods from the lower floors to the upper 
floors to keep them above the rising waters. As it turned out, the 
flames never reached the building, but a quantity of goods was 
damaged by water. It was held that the damage was covered under 
the fire policy. The result seems justified. It might be commented 
that flood frequently increases the hazard of fire by depriving the 
insured premises of normal fire protection or by causing the aban-
donment of electrical apparatus while connected to a source of 
power, and a flood exclusion might reasonably be expected in a 
fire insurance policy if coverage is not intended where flood is a 
contributing factor. 
Another type of situation in which the uninsured event causes 
the insured event is where the loss has its origin in negligence. It 
is now the rule, and has been since a very early date, that negligence 
which causes the insured event does not void the coverage. A brief 
statement of the history of this point as it bears on fire insurance 
together with a collection of the early cases, is set forth by Mr. 
Justice Story in Waters v. Merchants' Louisville Ins. Co.111 He 
points out that "the practical inconvenience of carving out such 
an implied exception from the general peril in the policy, fur-
nishes a strong ground against it; and it is to be remembered, that 
the exception is to be created by construction of the court, and is 
not found in the terms of the policy." As every undenvriter knows, 
practically all fires are caused by negligence. 
100 Denham v. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 
U.S. 871 (1948). 
110 115 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1940). 
11136 U.S. (11 Pet.) 213, 221 (1837). For a similar case involving marine insurance, 
see Clarke &: Co. v. Mannheim Ins. Co., 210 S.W. 528 (Tex. Com. App. 1919). 
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An occasional verdict for the defendant can be found in this 
type of case where the initial uninsured event is clearly beyond 
the intention of the insurance. Chute v. North River Ins. Co.112 
is an example. Plaintiff had insured an opal ring under an all-risk 
type of policy. Due to what was admittedly a slow and gradual 
disintegration of the stone, in a manner not uncommon to opals, 
the stone eventually cracked apart and became worthless. While 
cracking would normally be insured, the court held that, since 
natural change was not mentioned in the insuring agreement, 
cracking caused by such change was not covered. No doubt the 
defendant regarded this holding with relief but without confidence 
as to the future, since most policies of this type now contain an 
exclusion of natural deterioration. 
In the course of this discussion we have assumed for the pur-
pose of clarity that a problem of concurrent causation involves 
two substantial causes or events. This is of course not always true; 
there may be three or more events which would be regarded as 
substantial causes of the loss, particularly if we change the question 
which is asked. Perhaps the most graphic illustration of this for 
our purposes is to be found in cases where two or more forms of 
insurance are applicable. Many examples could be given, but New 
York and Boston Despatch Express Co. v. Traders' and Mechanics' 
Ins. Co.113 will suffice. Here the steamer Narragansett, running up 
Long Island Sound in the fog on a June night in 1880, was struck 
on the starboard side forward by the steamer Stonington. Plain-
tiff's goods, insured by defendant against the risk of fire, were in 
crates on the upper deck of the Narragansett and were undamaged 
by the collision. The Stonington backed off and stood by to help 
the Narragansett. A raging fire had broken out in the boiler room 
of the Narragansett, apparently as a result of the stem of the 
Stonington penetrating the starboard bunkers and the fire box. As 
a result of the fire, the chief engineer ·was forced to shut off steam 
from the main engine, thus rendering the ship's pumps inopera-
tive, pumps which would, if functioning, have been entirely capa-
ble of freeing the ship of water entering through the hole in the 
starboard planking. The Narragansett was partly consumed by 
fire and sank in nine fathoms of water. Plaintiff's property, being 
on an upper deck, was not touched by fire. It was later recovered 
in a water-damaged condition. 
112172 Minn. 13,214 N.W. 473 (1927). 
113 132 Mass. 377 (1882). 
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In the lower court the defendant secured a directed verdict. 
This judgment was reversed on appeal, the court stating that it 
was for the jury to determine whether the fire was the proximate 
cause of the loss. In its opinion the court takes pains to point out 
that the policy contains no exclusion of fire caused by collision. 
In itself the result of the case is of less interest today than the 
comments which may fairly be made upon its facts. It is not un-
reasonable to guess that a jury eventually found the fire to be the 
proximate cause of the loss, or more likely, that defendant settled 
the case in anticipation of such an outcome. What of the damage 
to the Narragansett herself? Almost certainly the ship was insured 
under a policy of marine insurance which undertook to indemnify 
the owners against loss caused by the perils of the sea. It may also 
be safely assumed that a claim was made under such policy for the 
value of the sunken vessel, and that such claim was paid. Having 
in mind the habits of steamship captains on a close schedule, one 
can also guess that, if the Coast Guard made an investigation of 
the collision, it would report that the collision had been caused by 
excessive speed under conditions of limited visibility. If given a 
chance to speak,the captain himself might point out that he would 
certainly have been discharged by the o-wners if he had made a 
practice of slowing down for every patch of fog and thus falling 
behind his schedule, and that it was this "hard driving" attitude 
which was the real cause of the accident. We can close the catalog 
of suggested causes by pointing out that the bow lookout on the 
Stonington might well have been asleep. There is little point in 
going farther; the lesson is easily understood. 
IX. SUMMARY 
A cause, like a unit of measurement, can be infinitely sub-
divided. Except by applying arbitrary limits to the process of 
subdivision, no accurate description of a cause can be given and 
no proof of the inevitable relationship between cause and effect 
can be made. A working concept of causation is of course essen-
tial to our daily affairs, and, in the words of Bertrand Russell, "in 
the infancy of a science." But the inevitable relationship between 
cause and effect remains unproved and apparently unprovable. 
Despite this philosophical weakness, by judicious use of events 
which are extraordinary to the experience of the community, in-
surance draftsmen have been able to avoid most of the problems 
which the theoretical nature of causation might seem to raise. Sue-
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cess has not been universal, however. From time to time there is a 
clash of giants, catastrophe joins with catastrophe, and the question 
of choosing between two or more substantial causes under an in-
surance contract is placed before the courts. 
Traditionally this problem has been solved by selecting a clas-
sic definition of proximate cause and applying it to the facts. Ac-
tually, the results have varied with the considerations of public 
policy applicable to the particular contract or to the social or eco-
nomic problem involved. Upon the same set of facts, a different 
proximate cause would be found in a negligence case than in a 
contract case. It is more honest and accurate to recognize in ad-
vance that the selection of a responsible cause depends on the 
question asked. 
Concurrent cause situations in the insurance cases can readily 
be divided into those in which an excluded cause plays a part, and 
those in which it does not. With numerous aberrations, the pres-
ent decision law holds that the defendant insurer is not liable in 
the first type of case, while it is liable on the second. This is a 
reasonable and justifiable result. One is entitled to assume that 
the draftsman understands those types of events which are incon-
sistent with insurance principles, and has the opportunity to ex-
clude them as causes of loss. Other unexpected events may prop-
erly fall on the insurer, not because of ambiguity, but because 
provision for insurable contingencies can be made in the premium. 
Unlike tort cases, no moral or punitive factors are involved in 
questions of insurance. The only proper long-term objective in 
developing new law, aside from the common need of predictability, 
is the creation of rules which encourage the economical and effi-
cient distribution of risks by means of insurance principles. Risk-
bearing by private as well as government insurers has become in-
dispensable to decent human life. When a court must break new 
ground, as it often must in concurrent causation cases, a public 
policy of this stature should be an important ingredient in its 
decision. 
